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Chapter 1- Introduction 
Opium cultivation has occurred in Asia for centuries, but why has Afghanistan seen such 
an explosion in opium production during the last two decades?  Furthermore, the increase in 
opium production disrupted the stability of rural livelihood strategies in the countryside.   Some 
research tries to explain this trend by citing the Taliban’s financial gains from opium production, 
or the international market for heroin.  While these issues are significant, they alone do not 
critically examine the multi-faceted role that the opium trade has in Afghanistan.  The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 marked the onset of nearly three decades of permanent turmoil, 
followed by the Afghan Civil War, the Taliban’s reign, and the U.S. invasion in 2001.  Before 
1979, Afghanistan had a decentralized state and large swaths of the mostly rural country had a 
subsistence economy based primarily on agriculture, whereas the commercial and industrial 
sectors were small.  A decade after the 2001 U.S. invasion, military occupation, and nation 
building efforts by the U.S. and its N.A.T.O. allies, the central government’s capacities still 
remain limited, the Taliban insurgency still rages on, with the pervasive insecurity undermining 
any sustained effort at rebuilding a vestige of a functioning and sustainable national economy.  
As a result, the country now largely depends on foreign aid, and in many rural areas opium 
production has become a rural livelihood strategy. 
After the Soviet invasion in 1980, Afghanistan became the world’s leading supplier of 
opium and has continued to do so in 2011.  The prevailing explanations for the proliferation of 
the opium economy in Afghanistan point out several key factors: opium as a manageable and 
profitable cash crop brings a monetary income to farmers who are deprived of the ability to 
produce their food crops due to violence and the destruction of infrastructure, economic stability 
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to farmers, drug trafficking thrives primarily when country has been in a state of permanent 
turmoil, and the Taliban fund their insurgency because of the drug trade.  Some of these ideas are 
more insightful than others, but they all lack a careful analysis of the geographic, cultural, and 
social complexities of the context of Afghanistan’s opium production.  The country is 
geographically and demographically diverse. The geographical and political experiences for a 
landowning farmer in Balkh are substantially different than that of a seasonal wage laborer in 
Helmand.  Yet both may earn income from opium production and the prevailing tendency is to 
view this as a farmer who earns income from illicit crops.  These explanations fail to address 
differences in geography, income, land ownership, state penetration of society, and the internal 
and external political actions in Afghanistan. 
The research and literature on drug trafficking in Afghanistan is abundant and contested, 
especially because of the various external influences in the country.  Historically, both the Soviet 
Union and the U.S. flooded Afghanistan with money and military equipment during the 1980s.  
The U.S. repeated this policy in its 2001 invasion, thus re-forging relationships with militia 
commanders that fought the Soviet Union.  Part of this relationship, both in the 1980s and more 
recently, entailed the empowering of armed “resistance” groups to monopolize violence and 
control aspects of an illicit economy, one of which is opium production.  Thus, the changing 
power relationships are vital in understanding the context of opium production in Afghanistan. 
 The country’s glaring lack of infrastructure and economic productivity are areas that were 
exacerbated by the Soviet Union, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Pakistan 
that also contribute to the context of opium production and resultant stability.  However, using 
flawed analysis to understand the context of opium production only helps to reinforce the 
unequal power relationships that drive it and does not address dependency on opium as a 
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livelihood.  The question is not whether opium production is defined within the realm of what is 
legally permissible, or not.  The questions that should be emphasized are ones that address the 
structural drivers of opium production and who actually benefit from it.  It should also be 
concerned with the majority of the population who are involved with opium production, like the 
Afghan farmers, landowners, informal creditors, and wage and seasonal laborers that 
predominantly engage in this livelihood strategy.1   Clearly, a far more nuanced understanding of 
opium production should address these issues and determine the consequences for this group.   
A critical analysis of all of the factors involved with Afghanistan’s opium production 
indicates that it may occur as a rural livelihood strategy for farmers, wage laborers, and 
landowners.  It is not such a strategy for insurgents and drug traffickers who profit considerably 
more and engage in cultivation far less than these other groups. Opium production is neither 
uniform throughout the country, nor are the people that engage in it.  The prevailing assumptions 
that farmers cultivate solely for profit, that the Taliban drive the insurgency, and that opium 
spreads corruption need a careful examination.  Some farmers may profit whereas others are try 
to make ends meet.  The Taliban have a monopoly on violence in certain areas of the country, 
but so does the Afghan state and militia commanders that have the support of the U.S. and its 
allies.  This research addresses these issues and demonstrates that opium production as a rural 
livelihood strategy may or may not be locally generated, the geopolitical context of Afghanistan 
must be addressed, and those that engage in at as a strategy can become more vulnerable to 
physical and economic insecurity. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Vanda	  Felbab-­‐Brown,	  Shooting	  Up:	  Counterinsurgency	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Drugs	  (Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  2009),	  
100-­‐120.	  
6	  
	  
Aims and Objectives 
 The overall goal of this research is to determine how opium production actually functions 
from each stage of development and examine the power structures that reinforce it. While some 
analysis focuses on how material conditions changed into a permanent state of conflict because 
of internal and external actors such as the U.S., the Soviet Union, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the 
U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Iran, my research demonstrates how opium production provides a 
measure of economic security to some Afghans and serves as a means of survival for others, and 
how that security can paradoxically de-stabilize the country.  In order to accomplish these tasks, 
I have asked several research questions: 
1. To what extent has geopolitics impacted opium production in Afghanistan since 1979?   
2. How did conditions change in a way that embedded opium production into the illicit 
economy?   
3. Following the second point, why has opium production endured? 
4. What physical traits do poppies have that make them advantageous and in what 
geographic areas can this be examined? 
5. What are the profits at each stage of opium production, how should the question of 
legality be examined, and what are its associated costs? 
6. What are the power relationships among actors in opium production and how do they 
influence Afghanistan’s stability? 
7. What transnational networks distribute, market, and profit from opium production, and 
how do they do so? Also, how are other countries complicit in the opium trade? 
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 In order to answer these questions, I have structured the thesis to systematically analyze 
opium production from the plant stage to its distribution.  The literature review discusses not 
only different types of literature on Afghanistan, but also how societal changes emerged from a 
state of permanent turmoil and the consequences for opium production.  Following that, the 
chapter on physical traits analyzes opium as a crop and the geography of Afghanistan by 
focusing on Nangarhar, Balkh, Ghor, and Badakhshan for frames of reference.  Next, I critique 
opium profits and distinguish which groups profit and how much, and include price changes in 
Nangarhar and Ghor.  Furthermore, the power relationships are critical in understanding the 
drivers of opium production, so this chapter analyzes three different cases with unique power 
dynamics that influence opium.  Lastly, opium networks are addressed and the value chains that 
constitute them as well as the role that refugees had in forming some of them.   
Finally, an issue that follows these points deals with recommendations for future action.  
Based on the research in this thesis, opium production must be considered differently based on 
the actors that are involved with it.  A key conclusion shall negate the prevailing assumption that 
opium is a guaranteed profit, but that the increasingly marginalized and resource-poor Afghans 
use opium as a rural livelihood strategy.  From here, opium production’s affect on stability 
depends on a variety of circumstances and the power structures that manipulate them.  Using this 
research to intimately understand the context in which opium production affects stability creates 
more informed analysis on one aspect of turmoil in Afghanistan.  Finally, we must understand 
the expansion of opium production by using the analytical framework provided here.  If so, then 
foreign policy may actually be able to assist in providing viable alternatives for marginalized 
Afghans that become wholly dependent on opium to survive. 
Scope, Limitations, and Methodology 
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 The time frame of this research begins in 1979 and ends with current reports on the 
social, political, and economic conditions in Afghanistan.  Some references are made to the 
economy and social networks in Afghanistan before 1979, but that serves to highlight changes in 
economic and social conditions.  The chapters that follow analyze opium production through 
geography, profits, power relations, and networks of distribution.  However, the social, 
economic, and political conditions in Afghanistan radically changed after 1979, so it is important 
to address this issue.  Afghanistan, with a weak national economy and few natural resources, 
experienced armed invasion due to the political climate during the Cold War and the War on 
Terror.  Detailed backgrounds of these eras are outside the scope of this research, but the 
material changes they initiated are important and are addressed in the literature review. 
 A significant data reference for this work stems from official accounts of opium 
production as mandated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).  Research 
that focuses on drug trafficking has limitations when it comes to data and biased points of view.  
First, the UNODC has a comprehensive database that details the amount of opium produced in 
Afghanistan in hectares, as well as its market value.  Furthermore, it also maps the geographic 
destinations of Afghanistan’s opium exports.  This data often demonstrates the “effectiveness” of 
eradication programs or sensationalizes the “terrorist threat” from opium production.  I will 
challenge this tendency by using data from official accounts to demonstrate where opium is 
produced, how much money it makes, and where it is known to go.  I will not use these statistics 
to portray advances of terrorism or any sort of domino effect, but rather to demonstrate a lack of 
context in some evaluations of opium production.  
 The thesis research analyzes social, economic, and political conditions that are unstable, 
and how the illicit opium economy prospers in them.  Instability itself is not a quantifiable 
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measurement, and I will not assume hectares of opium equals instability.  I will examine the 
context of opium production and instability with literature that details four eras between 1979 
and 2010, specifically the Soviet Invasion in 1979, the Afghan Civil War, the Taliban’s rule and 
the U.S invasion in 2001 and its aftermath.  The literature review primarily addresses societal 
changes during the Soviet invasion and the thesis chapters address opium production since 2000.  
For example, the Taliban could not maintain its control of the Helmand Province if it kept its 
opium ban in the 1990s, so it rescinded the ban and opium production increased dramatically.  
This political decision was brought on by the instability that came from trying to ban opium 
there.   
 Another part of my research will be to evaluate attempts at drug control efforts over the 
time period, specifically when the Taliban were in control and after the U.S. invasion.  A 
substantial amount of research has been done on the lack of effectiveness of eradication 
programs.  Furthermore, interviews with Afghan farmers frequently note that opium would not 
be cultivated so heavily if alternatives were available that are reliable and provide the means to 
access essential goods like clothes, medicine, and food2.  However, due to limited land access, 
poor irrigation, and territorial insecurity these options are severely limited in many places.  
Although a feature of the new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan features alternative livelihoods, it 
remains to be seen how they will address structural drivers that influence opium production.   
 While current drug control efforts are important components to this research, the 
foundation of drug control rests on the issue of legality.  The central state and national laws are 
what deem opium production in Afghanistan to be illegal.  Following the 2001 invasion by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  interviews	  conducted	  by	  David	  Mansfield	  between	  2002	  and	  2010	  are	  frequently	  cited	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  
chapters.	  	  David	  Mansfield	  currently	  works	  as	  a	  fellow	  at	  Harvard	  University’s	  Carr	  Center	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Policy	  
and	  uses	  his	  fieldwork	  in	  different	  areas	  of	  Afghanistan	  to	  analyze	  the	  context	  of	  rural	  opium	  production.	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U.S., the Afghan Interim Authority (ATT) banned opium production.3  This decision should be 
expected given that U.S. advisors, who believed drug production should be illegal, drove the 
ATT’s mandate.  However, the literature review demonstrates that, historically, Afghanistan’s 
central state had limited influence in the mostly rural countryside.  This is not to insinuate that 
the capital, Kabul, is a bastion of the rule of law while the countryside is a lawless frontier.  
Instead, the state authority’s legitimacy and influence are limited, thus making such bans 
difficult to enforce on vulnerable cultivators.   
 Furthermore, the thesis analyzes the global demand for heroin and its influence on 
Afghanistan’s opium economy.  An important distinction to make here is the difference between 
heroin and opium.  Opium is needed to make heroin and roughly ten kilograms of opium are 
required to produce one kilogram of heroin, not including precursor chemicals.4  The ten 
kilograms are a generally accepted estimate and does not factor in morphine content of Afghan 
opium versus, for instance, Colombian opium.  With this distinction in mind, the market for 
heroin usually considers the U.S. and Western Europe, but there are emerging markets in 
Afghanistan’s neighboring countries as well.  An interesting methodological approach in this 
section deals with data from the UNODC database.  Statistics demonstrate decreases in hectares 
of cultivation supporting evidence for eradication between 2002 and 2010 when the U.S initiated 
intensive eradication campaigns.  Also, the value of opium is usually portrayed as an incentive 
for insurgents, hereafter referred to as armed resistance groups that have the goal of destabilizing 
and dismantling the current Afghan national government.  While those groups obviously benefit 
from drug trafficking, I will examine how increased eradication efforts raise the price of opium 
and make it a more profitable enterprise.  To sum up, I will critique and synthesize the studies on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Carlotta	  Gall,	  “Seven-­‐Year	  Drought	  Puts	  Afghanistan	  on	  the	  Brink.”	  New	  York	  Times	  December	  2004.	  
4	  Email	  interview	  with	  David	  Mansfield	  on	  February,	  8th	  2011.	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conditions in Afghanistan to determine what levels of instability are related to opium production 
in different areas of the country.  
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Chapter 2- Literature Review 
Research and literature about Afghanistan contains several themes.  Authors and 
institutions frequently contribute literature on Afghanistan to the global geostrategic system.  
This literature analyzes the armed conflicts that began with the Soviet invasion in 1979 and 
explains actions from the international community’s geostrategic lens.  In addition, official 
institutions of the United Nations, primarily the UNODC, compile substantial databases on 
Afghanistan’s opium production. With regard to opium, the reports from these offices reinforce 
strategies and analyses on the issue that are lacking a deep contextual understanding.  Another 
aspect of the literature analyzes the changing social relations amid the context of turmoil.  
Finally, the most useful set of literature about Afghan opium production analyzes it at the local 
level and examines the context in which groups do or do not benefit from it.   
Geopolitical Background of Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion, Civil War and Taliban 
Control, the U.S. Invasion and Aftermath 
 Some literature focuses on the geopolitical importance of Afghanistan and the actions 
that external countries have had there over the past thirty years.  This literature discusses the 
political, social, and economic conditions in Afghanistan before, during and after repeated 
invasions and armed conflict.  Although the focus on these conditions varies on the author or 
institution, several overarching themes are apparent.  First, external actions by the Soviet Union, 
the U.S., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and others in the last stages of the Cold War heavily influenced 
the changes in Afghan society during the Soviet invasion.  Analyses also illustrate the illicit yet 
very real power of warlords and their relationship with emissaries from the aforementioned 
countries and their influence on society.  Most importantly, this literature demonstrates how 
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conditions were altered and, in part, created an atmosphere for the perpetuation of opium 
production in Afghanistan.   
 The onset of armed conflict in 1979 marks the period when societal changes took place, 
however it does not necessarily mean that opium production is integral to geopolitics.  However, 
my thesis addresses the change in conditions to frame how society changed in a way that could 
embed opium production as a livelihood.  One must be careful in talking about opium and 
geopolitics, because the Soviet Union and the U.S. did not invade Afghanistan to control its 
opium production, they invaded over competing ideologies and retaliation for the 9/11 tragedy, 
however this process exemplifies how societal conditions changed. The main authors who 
contribute to this body of literature are Olivier Roy (1990), Barnett Rubin (2002), Seth Jones 
(2009), B.D. Hopkins (2008), Vanda Felbab-Brown (2009), and Ahmed Rashid (2000).  
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and remained there for the 
next ten years.  Many scholars cite this time period as when opium production became an 
embedded illicit economy because of the Central Intelligence Agency and Inter-Services 
Intelligence Agency’s (CIA and ISI) funding of the Mujahedin.  It should be noted that the terms 
illicit and informal are both used to describe aspects of the opium economy in Afghanistan in this 
thesis.  The informal aspect refers to informal credit access because it is not sanctioned or 
sponsored by a state entity.  The illicit opium economy means that activities and profits from 
opium production are illegal as defined by state laws.  However, often overlooked aspects were 
the important socio-political and economic changes that allowed the opium economy to flourish.  
Before the Soviet invasion, agriculture occupied 60% of the economy, 85% if one factors in rural 
14	  
	  
trade and crafts.5  Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, agriculture produced wheat, 
vegetables, fed livestock, and substantial amounts of fruit that were consumed locally and 
nationally and exported.  In fact, the majority of the cultivable land was used to produce, 
consume, and sell agricultural products at the local and national level.6  However, the Soviet-
backed Communist government, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 
introduced land agrarian reform in 1978 that radically affected rural society. 
 Agrarian reform began by first doing away with the mortgage and usury systems on 
farms and redistributing land.  Any debt that was over five years old was cancelled without 
remuneration and mortgages less than five years old were returned with a small interest 
payment.7  Furthermore, according to the new law no single family could own more than six 
hectares of fertile land.  Some of those who received the redistributed portions were landless 
peasants, itinerant laborers, and landowners with less than six hectares.8  If landowners were 
found to be in possession of more than the prescribed amount, the property was confiscated 
without compensation.  Within Afghanistan’s context, this reform movement was highly 
problematic. 
 Although the majority of peasants owned less than the maximum permissible amount of 
land and would have benefited from the reform, the implementation inspired active resistance.  
First, research indicates that the reforms did not adhere to social and economic realities in 
Afghanistan.  The system of agriculture and farming was not actually a feudal system of the 
medieval type, but some peasants owned land, some landowners incurred debts, and mortgage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Barnett	  Rubin,	  The	  Fragmentation	  of	  Afghanistan:	  State	  Formation	  and	  Collapse	  in	  the	  International	  System	  (New	  
Haven,	  CT:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  32.	  
6	  Ibid.,	  	  32-­‐33.	  
7	  Olivier	  Roy,	  Islam	  and	  Resistance	  in	  Afghanistan	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  	  86.	  
8	  Ibid.,	  p	  86.	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systems were significant in rural Afghanistan, as it shall be seen below.9  Moreover, community 
relationships are extremely important and the agrarian reforms overlooked communal goods and 
services.  While rural farming was not egalitarian, the importance of mutual self-interest cannot 
be overlooked.  The sharing of work, property, and irrigation was not at all uncommon, but the 
reforms aimed to do away with this without an alternative.10  The following two decrees marked 
the onset of increasing state penetration into society and interfered with the web of social roles 
that linked segments of the population. 
 As mentioned above, the sixth decree canceled debts and mortgages of peasant farmers to 
wealthier landowners.  Unfortunately, the “feudal system” managed to provide goods and 
services to the poor as well as material for agricultural production.11  Wealthier landowners 
could provide credit in the form of farming equipment or seed and fertilizer with a promise of a 
return on the goods or profits.  In addition, the critical problem with the eight decree’s land 
reform stipulation was that it repossessed land without reimbursement, and in the view of 
Afghans it looked like theft.12   The PDPA used force to carry out these decrees in the 
countryside, and respected village elders who protested were arrested or executed.  These actions 
symbolized an illegitimate imposition of rule from the state and undermined a complex social 
network. 
 The PDPA’s redistribution of land highlights the social complexity of Afghanistan before 
the Soviet invasion.  The problems with the above decrees stem from the change in distribution 
of resources from kinship and communal networks to the state.  Therefore, these policies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Ibid.,	  87.	  
10	  Roy,	  Islam	  and	  Resistance	  in	  Afghanistan,	  87-­‐88.	  
11	  Anthony	  Arnold,	  “The	  Ephemeral	  Elite:	  The	  Failure	  of	  Socialist	  Afghanistan,”	  eds.	  Myron	  Weiner	  and	  Ali	  
Banauazizi,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Social	  Transformation	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Iran,	  and	  Pakistan	  (Syracuse:	  Syracuse	  University	  
Press,	  1994),	  40.	  
12	  Ibid.,	  41.	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extended the state’s reach into the countryside and, while distributing resources, also endowed 
itself with more power.13  In contrast, the lack of understanding about Afghan society must be 
addressed to highlight the undermining qualities of these reforms.  First, the family represents a 
vital political and economic institution in Afghanistan because it reaches large kinship groups. 
Furthermore, characterizations of Afghanistan often negatively describe it as a tribal society.  
Herein lies a core problem with this characterization and the land reforms.  The context in which 
the word tribe is used represents kinship groups that can be very large with designated leaders 
and legal codes that are separate from the state.  An extension of this that can apply to more 
Afghans is the qawm, which is more like a solidarity group.14  Qawms can vary between tribes, 
ethnicities, or occupations, but they represent an important factor that was destabilized by the 
PDPA’ land reforms. 
 Although the societal relations have been highlighted, what specifically was upset by 
these reforms?  To answer this, one must address the type of production common in rural 
Afghanistan and political leadership of khans.  Outside of large cities, family owned farms and 
sharecropping dominated the types of agricultural production before the land reforms.  These 
farms were run entirely by families and generally provided their own animals and agricultural 
equipment.  In contrast, sharecropping arrangements saw tenants receive a portion of the crop if 
they used their own materials and about one sixth of the crop if the farm owner provided the 
resources.15  Although the term sharecropping was used to describe post-slavery era farming in 
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the U.S., before the Soviet invasion and land reforms, huge landholdings and extreme destitution 
were less common in Afghanistan than in places like India or Southeast Asia.16 
 Following these examples of production are the roles that khans play in kinship networks.  
The khan represented the rural leader in a kinship network and men received this role through 
patronage, redistribution of his own wealth, and hospitality.17  Some of the responsibilities of 
khans include arranging economic cooperation among families, interacting with the state, and 
providing public goods such as irrigation.  They distinguished themselves from state actors 
because of their ties and service to kinship networks.18  Therefore, the land reforms destabilized 
an entrenched network of social relations that maintained mutual benefits for the participants.  
While swaths of the countryside were in fact poor, the imposition of these reforms upset the 
balance and reciprocity that Afghans were accustomed to and undermined complex networks of 
mutual dependency. 
 By the time the Soviet Union invaded the country, rural Afghanistan was actively 
resisting the Communist government and societal relations were disrupted.  However, the Soviet 
invasion piqued the interest of the U.S. because of the ideological war against Communism that 
largely defined the Cold War.  Now, resistance movements in the country were on the radar of 
U.S. policy makers, but the only important issue was if the Soviet Union could win in 
Afghanistan.  Unfortunately, the U.S. and other Western governments were not interested in the 
social structures that formed different resistance groups.19  An analysis of these structures and 
their changes provides insight into the ways in which permanent warfare altered Afghan society. 
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 The main factor of social change over Afghanistan’s past three decades is its state of 
conflict that forced migration of refugees, increased urbanization in the capital, and changed 
relations among societal groups.  Prior to the Soviet invasion, conflict in Afghanistan was 
secondary to agricultural concerns and without regime-changing objectives.20  The Soviet 
invasion, and subsequent conflicts, implemented full-scale war that required full-time fighting.  
Before addressing the economic changes, the new political leadership and social ties that 
emerged from this fighting must be discussed. 
 The old guard of political leadership in Afghanistan, prior to the Soviet invasion, was 
made of Afghans who were educated, urban, and from wealthy families.  After the onset of 
warfare, the Mujahedin were not made of the traditional landowning families.  The Mujahedin 
were Islamists, those who use Islam as a political ideology rather than a religion, from families 
with ties to the rural population.  Also, they are ethnically and linguistically diverse.  Tajiks 
made up Jamiat-i-Islami, a faction within the Mujahedin, and spoke Persian, while Pashtuns were 
found more in Hizb-i-Islami, another faction.21  However, according to the prior analysis on 
khans and qawms, these new Mujahedin leaders lacked legitimacy.  Therefore, social and 
political changes are seen as the new leadership aimed for support.22  In order to accomplish this 
task, the Mujahedin leaders could develop a new political structure that ignored the existing 
networks, declare themselves self-made khans through patronage and also with the influx of 
weaponry, or connect their new position with existing kinship networks.   
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 Furthermore, one should not confuse the Mujahedin as a homogenous group; in fact they 
contained ideological, religious, and ethnic diversions within them.  The first two diversions 
among the Mujahedin were ideological in that some Islamists were more radical than others and 
some did not think fighting the Soviet Union required a change in pre-existing social structures.23  
In addition, some Mujahedin identified with Sufi religious networks focused in Afghanistan 
while others followed clerics educated in madrasas in Pakistan.  From an ethnic perspective, 
Jamiat-i-Islami and Hizb-i-Islami, the two main factions, were primarily Tajik and Pashtun, 
respectively.  A major difference between these two dealt with how they sought legitimacy.  
Gulbiddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hizb-i-Islami relied more heavily on Mujahedin he could 
recruit from displaced Afghans in Pakistan.  In contrast, Ahmed Shah Masud, the military 
commander of Jamiat-i-Islami, tried to link this group with existing networks.  Since Masud’s 
followers were less influenced by the existing qawm networks because of their social 
background, they adopted a broader identity to co-opt larger groups.24   
 The perpetual state of turmoil brought on new political leadership that did not resemble 
the pre-existing networks in the countryside.  In order to wage this war, the new political 
leadership engaged in tactics to garner support while simultaneously altering social structures.  
While social and political changes are important, changes in the economy must be addressed as 
well.  Previous villages and towns that were difficult to access became important safe-havens for 
resistance groups.25  Furthermore, these same areas saw microeconomic activity increase in the 
forms of inns, bazaars, and “roadside stations.”  The microeconomic activity also facilitates 
smuggling activities that deal with legal and illicit goods such as opium.  Although previously 
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inaccessible regions gained importance, developed roads, infrastructures, and other forms of 
economic activity were actively destroyed.26  Another dramatic consequence of the Soviet 
invasion was the enormous involuntary displacement to Iran and Pakistan.  Millions fled 
Afghanistan or were internally displaced.  Lastly, these political and economic changes created 
unstable regions that were important for resistance groups, and cut off parts of the population 
from major economic centers. 
While the U.S., Egypt, Pakistan, the U.A.E., Uzbekistan, and Saudi Arabia channeled 
funds and weapons to the Mujahedin through Pakistan, the following consequences were 
overlooked.  Pakistan had its own agenda with the Afghan Mujahedin and exacerbated factions, 
hoping to achieve a proxy state in Afghanistan.27  The implications of this involvement were 
dire: rival factions were receiving vast financial and military support but were also being actively 
divided by Pakistan’s ulterior motives for the region.  The state and the resistance groups 
fighting the Soviets could not claim any secure part of the country.  Meanwhile, the arms and 
resources that were being smuggled into the country often saw opium being smuggled out, which 
bore no apparent relevance to the objectives of the U.S. and Pakistan.28  
Some of the lasting social and political conditions created by the Soviet invasion are 
critical in understanding the instability that remained after the withdrawal in 1989.  The Afghan 
Mujahedin were flushed with weapons and money, and were allowed to secure funds through 
opium trafficking by the U.S., its allies, and Pakistan.29  At the same time, the urban population 
increased during the 1980s because of internal displacement and weakened the legitimacy of 
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Mujahedin commanders.30  As a result, the commanders wielded powerful militias but lost some 
of their rural base because of urbanization.  They therefore needed to recruit more and more 
Afghans to maintain their resistance against the Soviet Union.  In addition, the commanders 
started to add khan (generally a leader of a tribal network, in this case) to their names to enhance 
their local status.31   
Clearly the social and political consequences of the invasion were drastic.  Power 
relations changed dramatically as foreign resources empowered militia commanders without 
considering their political motives.  The point here is to emphasize the fact that competing 
groups were emboldened by foreign support, which combined to further de-stabilize the country 
as they struggled for power in the wake of the invasion.  Actions in Afghanistan decimated the 
economy and altered societal relations.  Support, in the form of weapons and money, was given 
to various groups as long as they fought the Soviets without considering the long-term 
consequences of these actions.  Opium production, which was ignored by the CIA and ISI as 
they funneled aid, was co-opted by warlords and Mujahedin commanders to additionally fund 
their networks.  The newly powerful positions they found themselves in made it beneficial to 
approve of opium cultivation since the population had limited access to other economic 
opportunities. 
Civil War and the Taliban 
 After the Soviet Union withdrew its forces in 1989, Afghanistan became embroiled in a 
civil war, which further intensified conditions that expanded the drug trade.  After President 
Najibullah’s regime collapsed in 1992, the Mujahedin controlled the country but internal conflict 
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soon emerged.32  Although the Soviet Union’s efforts in the country were highly problematic, the 
influx of weapons and money to resistance groups, via the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, 
without long-term analysis.  Two major factions, Jamiat-i Islami and Hezb-i Islami, were 
ideologically different and fought each other for control of the country.  However, thanks to the 
destruction of the infrastructure and economy, both groups gained valuable financial and 
political support from opium production, which entrenched this illicit economy even further. 
 For example, Jamiat-i Islami initially supported itself by smuggling gems from their 
regional base in the northeast part of Afghanistan.  However, the group started to tax opium 
cultivation as low as 2.5% but eventually reaching a 20%33.  These taxes were monetary in form 
but also in kind, with credit advances for opium to farmers.  In addition, the smuggling routes, on 
Afghanistan’s borders, that were used by people other than members of the Jamiat-i Islami were 
taxed as well.  Truckers that had no part of the drug trade used this route to smuggle goods other 
than opium into and out of Afghanistan to Pakistan, Iran, and Tajikistan, but were taxed by 
members of Jamiat-i Islami.34  Not only did these profits finance their combatants, they were also 
used to build military and government institutions that functioned outside of Kabul.  The 
freedom of action that the drug trade granted Jamiat-i Islami demonstrates the value that opium 
has and why groups would want to take advantage of it. 
 Throughout the late 1980s there was substantial forced migration to Pakistan because of 
the conflicts in Afghanistan.  During the Soviet invasion, family and social ties were severed and 
many young Afghans were orphans in Pakistan’s refugee camps.  This serves as yet another 
example of the interaction between conflict and social disruption.  Meanwhile, the young men 
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were educated in madrasas and eventually organized themselves into the Taliban.  The Taliban 
wanted to go back to Afghanistan and end the violence and chaos from years of civil war and 
warlordism.  However, Pakistan aided the Taliban with money and weapons such as transport 
helicopters and artillery.35  Pakistan’s aims were twofold: it wanted to achieve strategic depth 
against India and the disputed Kashmir region and it wanted to end the warlord’s harassment of 
the trucking mafia.  Therefore, Pakistan’s geopolitical concerns did not deal with the strife in 
Afghanistan, but its own security interests regarding the disputed Kashmir province and conflict 
with India.  Without Pakistan’s assistance, the Taliban would have had a significantly harder 
challenge in gaining control of the country.36  However, it would be a mistake to assume that 
Pakistan was the only backer of the Taliban. 
 While opium production brought substantial revenue to the Taliban, their control of the 
trucking network in the 1990s was vital.  For example, goods could be bought from Pakistan and 
trucked to Afghanistan without taxes.  They were then carried back into Pakistan and sold 
illegally by Afghan refugees who controlled this illicit economy, which in 1997 generated over 
$2 billion.  While the practice of paying tolls on the smuggling routes predates Afghan warlords 
of the 1990s, warlords, like Ismail Khan for instance, randomly increased toll prices and stopped 
trucks as many as twenty times on the same road.  The Taliban, whose origins trace back to the 
same refugee camps that control this smuggling network, protected smugglers from warlords.37  
The trust and support from smugglers, who often wielded influence in communities, was a 
critical support for the Taliban in its early years. 
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 One of the Taliban’s goals was to institute a strict interpretation of Shari’a, which banned 
the production and consumption of all intoxicants.  Helmand Province produces the largest 
amount of opium in the country, and the warlord Ghaffar Akhundzada brutally punished farmers 
who did not meet his quota.  His lack of popular support made the Taliban seem like a welcome 
change.  However, in keeping with their ban on intoxicants, poppy cultivation was initially 
prohibited.38  But Helmand Province proved to be too vital and the Taliban rescinded its ban on 
opium production.  Although the Taliban’s interpretation of Shari’a is notoriously austere, they 
acquiesced in regards to a dangerous intoxicant because they claimed Muslims would not 
consume it.39  Farmers and drug traffickers paid a relatively consequently paid a high tax on 
opium production to the Taliban, which generated enormous sums of money.   
 Although the Taliban’s finances benefited with this new addition, farmers and drug 
traffickers benefited from the control that the Taliban instituted over the opium economy.  
Feuding warlords with unpredictable taxes and punishments were much less attractive to both 
groups than the Taliban’s taxes.  Since the farmers and traffickers were satisfied, the Taliban 
benefited from its ability to consolidate power in the South.  The instability that was wrought by 
the Soviet invasion and civil war made opium production viable because of its profitability.  
Opium production needed a relatively high amount of labor, “approximately 350 person days are 
required to cultivate one hectare of poppy.40”  Thus, opium production was profitable for land 
owners and presented an opportunity for itinerant workers.  In addition, opium could be 
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harvested from less arable land than other crops like wheat, which needed more extensive 
irrigation systems that had been destroyed, and it was easier to store and transport.41   
 The Taliban’s positive involvement in the opium economy contrasted starkly with its lack 
of investment in a formal economy or infrastructure.  The Taliban would provide security, but 
their chief objectives were to use the money from the opium economy to increase its military 
prowess.  Therefore, the illicit economy of opium flourished during the Taliban’s rule.  Although 
social services were missing, the Taliban licensed farmers to cultivate opium and sold fertilizers 
to ease the process.  Furthermore, opium production caused other forms of illicit economies to 
develop where previous economic activity did not exist.  Rest stops, fuel stations, inns, and 
reconstruction projects sprang up in areas with high opium production, which employed other 
segments of the population that were not involved with opium.42   
 The civil war and the Taliban’s reign over Afghanistan are crucial in understanding the 
evolution of the opium economy in Afghanistan.  The civil war occurred because of a power 
vacuum after the Soviet Union fled the country.  Pervasive instability was a result of rival 
factions of warlords competing for control of territory.  These groups used drug trafficking as a 
means to consolidate power and finance their struggle against each other.  Since Pakistan’s 
security concerns with the Kashmir Province and India would benefit from a friendly (or proxy) 
government in Afghanistan, the Taliban, with Pakistan’s support, was able to capitalize on the 
warlord’s mistakes and gain control over the majority of the country.  While the trucking 
networks brought in profits, opium supplemented this and provided absolutely vital popular 
support from southern Afghanistan.  Although the Taliban are notorious for draconian 
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punishments for violations of Shari’a, they fostered opium production during their reign.  Shari' a 
law stipulates that intoxicants should not be produced for consumption, but the Taliban approved 
of production for sale and export.  The measure of security they provided to this illicit economy 
was crucial to maintaining their hold on the country. 
The U.S. Invasion and Aftermath 
 The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan began in 2001 and by January the Taliban were 
removed from power and the ATT began passing laws for the future of society.  The rationale for 
the Taliban’s fall often overlooks the fact that Pashtuns, once staunch supporters of the Taliban 
and the main ethnic group in the country, fought against the Taliban.  This is mainly because the 
year before saw another ban on opium production, most likely in order to raise the international 
price.  However, the ban had many of the negative effects on the population that they 
experienced in their initial ban in the 1990s.43  Without any sort of social or economic services in 
place, the Taliban’s hold on the country was due in large part to the economic lifeline that opium 
production created, thus fomenting resistance when it was banned. 
 Unfortunately, the ATT’s decision to ban opium production, orchestrated by the 
international community, was detrimental to the Afghan society and “nation-building” efforts in 
the country.  Afghanistan’s GDP was one of the lowest in the world, and some estimates note 
that in 2004 as much as 20% of the population did not have enough to eat for the year thanks to a 
seven-year drought.44  This sort of entrenched poverty increased the extent to which opium 
production took root in the social fabric.  Even the UNODC found that about two-thirds of the 
farmers they interviewed explained that the main reason for poppy cultivation was to alleviate 
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poverty.45  Due the drought, what other options did much of the population have?  The access to 
alternative crops and infrastructure was severely limited at best. 
 At this point, the ATT’s decision to ban opium was highly problematic because of the 
way that society had changed during the Taliban’s reign.  With the Taliban’s lack of concern for 
social services and infrastructure, opium “became a prerequisite for participation in the rural 
economy.”46  Opium became the negotiating currency for rent and land tenure contracts in some 
instances; payment of this kind proved to be more reliable than cash.  Furthermore, though the 
international price of heroin may fluctuate, the long-term price tends to be stable and allows 
farmers to have a steady income from opium production, where opium is the key ingredient for 
heroin.47  Even though earnings were steady, they were also higher than what farmers could 
make from the United States Agency for International Development.  Increased earnings allowed 
Afghans greater access to goods such as televisions, generators, and motorcycles.48  The ATT’s 
decision ignored these factors and also ignored the number of people employed by it.  Even 
though official statistics say less than 15% of the population is involved in opium production, 
this data does not include itinerant laborers for different parts of the season or people who start 
businesses that support major opium centers.   
 Just as the U.S. and Pakistan ignored drug trafficking in the 1980s, the U.S. repeated this 
policy immediately after the invasion.  At first, the number of U.S. forces in the country was 
very small, and substantial financial assistance was given to warlords who were defeated by the 
Taliban in the 1990s.  For example, General Tommy Franks explained that the U.S. would not 
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involve itself with drug interdiction.49  Although warlords financed their militias with U.S. 
support, they also relied heavily on opium production and interfering with this process would 
have interrupted the efforts at expelling the Taliban and tracking al-Qaida.  Again, policy 
decisions at the highest levels of government in the U.S. were shortsighted and propped up 
groups which had caused so much turmoil after the Soviet Union left the country in 1989. 
 For example, one notable warlord who managed to consolidate power through U.S. 
patronage was Hazrat Ali bin Bahawal Sheir.  He controlled about 18,000 militia fighters and 
was contracted by the U.S. to search for Osama bin-Laden in Tora Bora.50  However, he used 
this power to become the de facto ruler of Nangarhar where he threatened rivals with U.S. 
military airstrikes.  Ali bin Bahawal Sheir controlled this province with impunity and even 
introduced heroin processing plants there, where previously the processing was done in 
Pakistan.51  President Hamid Karzai co-opted newly powerful warlords, like Ali bin Bahawal 
Sheir, into roles as police chiefs and provincial governors.  The corruption that followed was 
rampant, as loyalty from police officers and military members gave them cuts from the drug 
profits.  Furthermore, warlords used opium much the same way that the Taliban did.  The opium 
economy consolidated power for many warlords because it delivered profits and job security to 
segments of the population.  Since government officials became connected to the drug trade, it 
was in their interest to hinder reconstruction efforts.  The cycle of opium production then repeats 
itself because traffickers and corrupt officials make money and do not allow alternative 
development to take place, leaving farmers with no choice but to produce opium. 
Official Accounts of Opium Production in Afghanistan 
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 An important body of research on opium production in Afghanistan comes from official 
accounts from the international community.  Among the international institutions that perform 
research and recommend policy on Afghanistan, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) most clearly pertains to Afghan opium production.  The UNODC produces volumes 
of detailed empirical research on opium production and links it to terrorism, crime, and 
insurgency.  While the database contributes substantial amounts of empirical data, the 
organization continues to promote these linkages without a full contextual analysis.  As a result, 
there are several theoretical and practical problems with this approach. 
 Although my thesis does not aim to deconstruct the theoretical framework of the 
UNODC, one inherent flaw should be noted.  The UNODC supplies information and 
recommendations on opium production to the countries that are presently active in Afghanistan, 
most notably the U.S.  This relationship problematizes the influence of the UNODC because it 
interprets findings to support the goals of its benefactors, such as the U.S.  The policy report 
“Addiction, Crime, and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium” is indicative of 
the vast majority of UNODC reports.  Within this report, the UNODC links opium to criminal 
syndicates, the Taliban, and terrorists.52  First, the links that the UNODC allege are realistic to 
some degree, but focus on a small portion of those involved with opium production.  Most 
importantly, the report addresses the profitability of opium far too broadly and without the focus 
necessary to critically analyze who profits from opium and in what ways. 
 While the link between opium and the Taliban oversimplifies dynamic power relations, 
the main flaw with the UNODC’s reports is with its analysis of profit.  First, the global drug 
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trade and gains by traffickers and the Taliban are only estimates.  It can be safely assumed that 
these numbers are very high, but there are no public records of reported drug income for the 
Taliban.  Furthermore, the UNODC reports on “opium growing” and “non-opium” growing 
households when analyzing the profit for farmers.53  This form of analysis assumes that farmers 
do not cultivate other crops and raise livestock and that all farmers can be uniformly analyzed.  
However, Afghan farmers own varied amounts of land, have different access to a variety of 
resources based on geography and access to irrigation, engage in sharecropping, seasonal wage 
labor on farms, and utilize an informal credit system with opium.  These factors radically adjust 
the profit levels for farmers and demonstrate that “opium growing” and “non-opium growing” 
households are far too limited in their scope. 
 Another important part of the UNODC reports focuses on the international demand for 
heroin, and the opium required for its production, and the prices it can fetch in other countries.  
This information supposedly illustrates the “transnational threat” of Afghan opium but also 
demonstrates the external demand for opium production and the exorbitant prices international 
markets afford.  However, the UNODC reports do factor in to the analysis presented in this 
thesis.  They demonstrate the flaws in counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan and the way in 
which external countries’ counternarcotics policies exacerbate the reproduction of opium in 
Afghanistan.  Furthermore, they shall serve to illustrate the variance between profits at the 
international level and the Afghan farmgate. 
Anthropological Approach: Changes in Social Relations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Ibid.,	  96-­‐98.	  
31	  
	  
 An often overlooked, but no less important, aspect of the literature on Afghanistan 
concerns the change in social relations that began during the Soviet invasion and continues to 
develop. Although the power relations embedded in opium production are analyzed later in the 
thesis, the general structure of social relations highlights the context of opium production and 
illustrates the importance of state and non state actors in Afghanistan.  Several authors heavily 
contribute to this topic, including Barnett Rubin (2002), Ahmed Rashid (2000, 2008), Anthony 
Giustozzi (2006), David Mansfield (2005), Jonathon Goodhand (2008), and Adam Pain (2006). 
 One essential conclusion from this literature explains that in Afghanistan, assuming rural 
areas are backwards and city-centers are modern is inaccurate.  Both areas of Afghanistan 
contain diverse social relations that change continually.54  In the 1970s, the Afghan state used 
intermediaries to delegate state functions to local people, and these intermediaries were villagers 
with esteem and power.  In addition, these intermediaries also represented the public to the state 
and could manipulate both positions to enhance their status.55  Another vital analysis challenges 
the conventional Western perception of corruption.  The state before the Soviet invasion existed 
outside of the community and daily life in Afghanistan.  However, to resist the state community 
members would enter the bureaucracy and limit the encroachment of the state into rural society.  
This form of subversion diluted the state encroachment on society and was accepted by 
communities as long as it was reasonably perceived as beneficial to the community itself.  In 
contrast to present day Afghanistan, community members-turned state officials engaged in 
activities that were mutually beneficial for the state and society, with the tacit approval of both 
parties.  As the prior research demonstrates, Afghanistan historically resisted attempts at state 
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penetration.  However, what may be considered corrupt from a Western policy perspective may 
not be in rural Afghanistan if it promotes a societal norm like resisting state encroachment.   
Currently, the type of corruption that arises from opium production reinforces unequal 
relationships that favor power brokers over rural farmers or laborers.56   
 Near the end of the Soviet invasion between 1987 and 1989, factionalized resistance in 
the form of rival mujahedin militias started to make attempts at power consolidation.  Literature 
at this time states that even in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, fighting should escalate, 
which it in fact did in the form of civil war.  One of Roy’s key observations was that the flood of 
money and weapons into society exacerbated fragmentation and escalated violence.57  Roy also 
prophetically analyzes the impact of the initial Taliban (before they were named this) on 
changing social relations.  Also, the refugees controlled smuggling routes and further 
factionalized local militia commanders, and set up the sympathetic network that the Taliban 
would exploit during the civil war.58  
 Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the flood of money and arms to Afghan militias 
from the U.S. and its allies quickly dried up and left Afghan militia commanders difficult 
choices.  In order to continue maintaining their militias, the warlords increasing resorted to 
predatory behavior after they were left to find their own ways of funding their militia.59  Unlike 
the subversive actions by tribal leaders during the Soviet Invasion that were mutually beneficial, 
warlords acted in their own self interest.  Extortion, robbery, and intimidation were part of the 
tactics used by warlords to increase their power because of their monopoly on violence.  While 
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warlord factions preyed upon the civilian population, predatory warlordism did not escalate in 
the Pashtun areas in the way it did elsewhere.  This is because the social relations that developed 
between the new Afghan mullahs educated in Pakistani refugee camps, the emergence of the 
Taliban, and their relationship with smuggling networks into Pakistan became vitally important 
resistance against warlords during the civil war.60After the fall of the Taliban and the U.S. 
invasion, many of the same practices were reinstated the U.S., such as funding the Northern 
Alliance with money and arms.  As in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion, similar consequences 
resulted from the actions of the international community.   
 The final set of literature to analyze opium production comes from previously mentioned 
authors like David Mansfield (2005), Jonathon Goodhand (2008), Adam Pain (2006), and 
institutions like the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit based in Kabul.  These authors 
focus their work on the rural livelihood context of opium production.  This literature focuses on 
the context of opium production in the rural livelihood strategies of increasingly marginalized 
Afghans.  The key conclusion from this research explains that opium dependency.  This term 
does not imply addiction as a drug; instead, opium dependency refers to economic dependence 
on the crop.  This dependence varies between province, actor, and household.  This process shall 
be elaborated on later, but it informs much of the research in this thesis.  Through analysis of the 
geopolitical history, social relations, external counternarcotics policies, and the context of rural 
livelihoods, this thesis analyzes the full context of opium production in Afghanistan and 
evaluates whether opium harms or facilitates stability.  Finally, by using this context to analyze 
power structures that reinforce inequality at the local level, this thesis provides a more useful 
analytical framework in understanding opium cultivation. 
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Chapter 3- The Plant: The Benefits of Opium Poppies 
 Why would farmers choose to cultivate opium as opposed to other crops?  What products 
compete with opium and why do cultivators choose opium in some places but not others?  
Today, a farmer in Nangarhar probably does not consider the influential roles that the CIA and 
ISI had in the 1980s regarding opium production for the Mujahedin.  Simply put, the entire 
country does not solely produce opium.  Wheat, rice, fruit, and livestock sustain livelihoods in 
provinces like Nangarhar, Balkh, Ghor, and Badakhshan.  However, the physical characteristics 
of opium and certain geographic and economic conditions are unique in these areas and 
determine where and to what extent farmers cultivate opium. 
Physical Traits 
 First, opium cultivation represents a labor-intensive enterprise that appeals to many 
jobless Afghans.  One hectare of poppy plants requires roughly 350 person days to cultivate and 
200 days to harvest.61  Compared to 135 days for black cumin and only 41 days for wheat, opium 
offers workers a steadier employment opportunity.  Furthermore, the Soviet invasion destroyed 
many underground irrigation systems which made traditional modes of grain and fruit production 
increasingly difficult.  However, opium does not require the same irrigation levels that wheat and 
fruit must have, thus making it easier to cultivate.62.  Finally, nonperishable and lightweight, raw 
opium can easily be transported or stored for long periods of time.63  Unlike livestock and fruit, 
both difficult to transport and susceptible to adverse weather and security conditions, opium 
remains a reliable source of income for many farmers. 
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 Another consideration for the physical geography is that opium poppies can be grown at 
elevation in the mountains and in hillsides where armed forces have trouble reaching, thus 
making it safer for farmers to cultivate.  Opium in the southern area of the country generally has 
more water content because the poppies are exposed to greater humidity in the harvest season.64  
Unlike the South, areas in the north and east produce opium with higher morphine content, and 
generally cause prices per kilogram to be higher than other parts of the country.  These 
characteristics are useful in understanding some of the physical differences in geography and the 
content of opium and provide a greater appreciate for the differences in the crop and its value. 
Basic Needs and Market Access 
 Proponents of eradication argue that increasing the risk that opium crops will be 
destroyed will encourage farmers to refrain from cultivation.  However, research in Afghanistan 
demonstrates that even farmers who have had their crop destroyed continue to plant poppies.  
Studies indicate that farmers incur financial losses and, more importantly, losses in potential 
income if they sought other crops or non-farm income.65  However, this argument assumes that 
there are viable alternatives everywhere that eradication takes place.  Alternatives would require 
access to markets with non-farm opportunities, such as city-centers like Kabul and Kandahar.  
Furthermore, crops other than opium also require greater quantities of water for irrigation and 
more stable security.66  In reality, many locations have poor market access and few natural 
resources.  Isolated and unstable regions have limited access to urban centers and risky means of 
transportation as well as limited crop options.   
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 Consequently, a household where there are few non-farm options and scant resources 
may easily become dependent on opium production.  How does eradication deter an opium 
farmer if resources do not allow him or her to cultivate fruit or wheat?  If resources did exist, 
there might not be a market to sell the licit crops and subsistence farming would take place.  
However, the demand for opium might encourage double-cropping, a practice where farmers 
have the resources to cultivate licit crops in addition to opium, so as to earn more profit.67  As a 
result, eradication does not raise the opportunity cost of poppy planting if there are no viable 
alternatives.68   
 Opium poppies provide a measure of security for the poor in places where state actors 
and market accesses are non-existent.  Generally, opium tends to be cultivated in places with 
little access to irrigated land, few non-farm income opportunities, and high levels of insecurity.69  
Furthermore, small landowners who produce strictly food crops such as wheat or vegetables are 
vulnerable to crop failure and water shortages in these areas.  Opium poppies, however, are low 
risk crops because they resist droughts, are non-perishable, and enjoy a reliable demand.  Unlike 
wheat, fruit and vegetables, opium creates access to land for landless farmers because poppy 
cultivation requires substantial labor.70  Those farmers that cultivate opium on a sharecropping 
basis then have access to land where they can grow other crops in order to maximize their 
revenue and sustenance.  Opium production does not follow a uniform pattern throughout the 
country, and several provinces demonstrate the different ways in which local conditions affect 
poppy cultivation. 
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Nangarhar  
 
 The Nangarhar province lies on the eastern border next to Pakistan and contains an 
estimated two million people.  Geographically, the province has a sub-tropical climate and the 
Kunar and Kabul rivers can provide ample irrigation opportunities.  Furthermore, the provincial 
capital of Jalalabad supplies labor markets to these regions.  However, Nangarhar was not 
immune to the droughts of the 1990s, which led to many farmers becoming dependent on opium.  
Statistics show a 96 percent reduction in opium between the 2004 and 2006 growing seasons, a 
fact that was lauded as a success against Afghanistan’s “drug problem.”  Unfortunately, 
economic stress and few assets made the ban on opium difficult to maintain, and saw a 285 
percent increase in hectares cultivated in the 2006-2007 growing season.71   
 What happened to the Nangarhar province between 2004 and 2006 that caused such an 
upsurge in opium cultivation?  While opium was banned, field evidence shows that farmers 
replaced the illicit crop with wheat.  However, the area landholdings were small, densely 
populated, and the wheat yield was inhibited by more droughts, thus making it difficult for 
farmers to be self-sufficient.  Since there was a decrease in non-farm income due to the 
population density, many households had to sell their meager assets and accumulated substantial 
debts.  In these instances, the 2006-2007 growing season was an opportunity to pay off debt with 
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opium production because there were very few other options due to the geographic and political 
conditions.72  The conditions in Nangarhar led to increased political instability.  Popular criticism 
of the government and resentment over the initial poppy ban are widespread as a result of the 
economic distress and corrupt enforcement of the poppy ban.  Consequently, the people in 
Nangarhar look to the insurgency for support against any government ban on their crops.   
 
Balkh 
 
 Like Nangarhar, the Balkh province has unique geographic and economic conditions that 
influence opium production in the region.  This area occupies on Afghanistan's northern plains 
and a major irrigation network makes use of the Balkh River.73  Furthermore, the Balkh province 
experienced settlement process focused on upstream and downstream locations, which 
determined a group's political and economic capital because.  While the population was not as 
dense, there was competition as to who could settle upstream and dominate access to water.  
Unfortunately, the irrigation system has been weakened by a population increases and poor water 
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management rules since the subsequent invasions by the Soviet Union and the U.S. and its 
allies.74  Therefore, the history of opium in the province can be examined in four phases. 
 The first phase of opium cultivation began before 1994 and was localized and not very 
substantial.  However, due to severe droughts in Afghanistan during the 1990s, the second phase 
lasted between the early 1990s and 2001 and the cultivation increased.  Between 2001 and 2006, 
generalized cultivation took place throughout the province, but the up and downstream 
settlements also influenced opium production.  The national government's ban on opium in 2006 
ended the third phase and ushered in the fourth.75  Hectares of poppy were dramatically reduced 
after 2006 as Balkh was hailed a poppy-free province.  The reasons for the reduction are 
attributed to awareness campaigns and economic development, but research casts doubt on this 
assumption. 
 The opium ban of 2006 did not raise the overall risk of opium production in Balkh for 
Afghans that live upstream and with more access to water.  The settlement process, however, 
indicates the power relations that allowed the ban to continue.  Upstream settlers who were 
economically prosperous control the opium economy in Balkh.76  Their ability to control the 
opium trade allowed them the wherewithal to enforce the ban or not.  In the case of Balkh, the 
ban was enforced because of this political power within the region.  As a consequence, upstream 
settlers who are economically, and now politically, connected can use opium production as a 
double crop to maximize their profits.77  Downstream settlers or landless workers, due to the 
water shortage, find opium production a means of survival.   
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Ghor and Badakhshan 
Ghor Province 
 Research indicates that Ghor resembles a mountain economy, with dispersed settlement 
around small water resources.  The agriculture relies on rain-fed crops and high altitude farming 
carefully accounts for land devoted to crops and livestock.78  From another standpoint, food 
insecurity can be dangerously high because of the mountain economy, thus influencing the 
decision to cultivate opium.  However, Ghor experienced a decrease in opium production since 
2005.  Again, the government's ban on cultivation likely did not cause the decrease in opium 
production.  Opium crops have failed in Ghor since the 2004-2005 growing season and prices 
have dropped accordingly.  Normally, an opium farmer can rely on traffickers to travel to the 
farm gate to buy opium, thus decreasing the risk in travelling.79  Unfortunately, Ghor's poor 
opium yields have discouraged drug traffickers from travelling to Ghor to buy the crop. 
 Badakshan Province 
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 In contrast, Badakhshan is located on the northeastern border and has a long history of 
opium cultivation.  The predominant feature of Badakhshan is its lack of accessibility.  Very 
high mountains and steep river valleys cut the province off from much of the population, which 
enables farmers to cultivate crops in relative safety.  However, due to the region's isolation, 
Badakhshan farmers cannot recruit off-farm laborers to work the labor-intensive opium fields.80  
Although the province's geography makes contact difficult, it was not immune to government 
efforts at controlling opium cultivation.  However, farmers view these efforts as attempts by 
military or police commanders to control the opium economy for political and economic 
power.81  Farmers note that commanders would eradicate opium or coerce farmers into not 
planting poppies as much as they protect opium fields in areas where they derive political and 
military support.   
Conclusion 
 A farmer’s decision to cultivate opium does not require much questioning in these 
contexts.  Will I be able to provide enough food for my family?  Can I earn more money this 
season if I double the crop?  However, the underlying factors that force farmers to ask 
themselves this question are more complex and require more investigation.  The state of 
permanent armed conflict created conditions for opium production to expand, but they alone do 
not explain one farmer’s decision to plant poppies in the present.  The four provinces highlighted 
above demonstrate that geographical conditions, water resources, and crop yields influence 
whether or not farmers will plant poppies.  The uniqueness of each province’s geography 
indicates the complexity of opium production at even a basic level like the location of poppy 
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cultivation.  In addition, these factors also may determine power relations, especially in the case 
of settlement in the Balkh province.  To sum up, the conditions in this chapter demonstrate that 
opium has unique attributes that make it a profitable enterprise, but that it also depends on the 
conditions of the province in question.  Whether or not farmers have adequate food and water 
demonstrates that instability can be in different forms besides the presence of anti-government 
insurgents.  However, the state’s actions towards opium will also influence local actors and anti-
government forces’ actions as well, with the chance to further augment turmoil in places where 
livelihoods depend on opium. 
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Chapter 4- Profits from Opium Production 
 
 The term “drug trade” conjures images of kingpins that operate lucrative drug trafficking 
operations in which all members are overwhelmingly motivated by the potential for profit.  With 
a potential export value of nearly three billion dollars in 2009, Afghanistan’s opium economy 
seems to fit this stereotype.82  Profit can be a strong motivator, but does it accurately explain the 
context in which a farmer near Kandahar cultivates opium?  No, because a critical analysis of 
opium profits uncovers where profits are made and dispels the notion that all actors are 
motivated solely by income.  While high potential values are real, they affect only a small 
segment of those involved in this process.  For the other actors involved, opium reinforces 
dependency on the illicit economy and can become a means of survival that exacerbates 
instability in the country. 
Who Makes Money? 
 The opium economy in Afghanistan involves a variety of groups and each group’s profits 
vary substantially.  Moreover, there are two kinds of profit, direct and indirect.  This chapter 
focuses on direct monetary profit, while indirect profit in the form of political capital shall be 
analyzed in the next chapter.  Although the definitions can blur together, one should not assume 
that all drug traffickers are insurgents and not all farmers are landowners, therefore distinctions 
need to be made in order to determine specific monetary gains.  For this chapter’s purposes, 
traffickers refer to drug traffickers that only seek profit from opium distribution.  Traffickers are 
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different than insurgents because of their lack of a political agenda.83  Although an analysis of 
the political capital that insurgents gain from opium production comes later in this work, the 
financial gains for the Taliban and selected warlords are significant because of the way they 
influence the illicit economy.  While considerable profits are concentrated among traffickers and 
insurgents, the most insightful information on opium profits comes from landowners, farmers, 
and migrant laborers.  These groups receive much less of the “potential export value” of opium, 
but nonetheless demonstrate that opium production in some places equates to survival and 
reinforces troubling power relations. 
Traffickers and Insurgents 
 As of 2009, the estimated value of the global opium trade was $65 billion with over 11 
million heroin users keep the demand high.84  Furthermore, the incentive for international 
smuggling increases as opium gets processed into heroin.  As a reminder, roughly ten kilograms 
of Afghan opium are used to produce one kilogram of heroin, and this estimation does not 
consider morphine content, which as noted earlier can vary between provinces.85  Ten kilograms 
of opium at the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan fetches about $32,000.  However, once 
one kilogram of heroin reaches Europe, its value skyrockets to between $150-170,000.  With 
over 7,000 tons of opium produced annually since 2006, the profits from this lucrative crop are 
vast.86  Among the actors within Afghanistan’s opium trade, traffickers and insurgents profit the 
most.  Studies indicate that between 2002 and 2008, traffickers earned over $18 billion and 
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insurgents were paid $600 million from taxation alone.87  While these current figures seem 
staggering, financial gains from opium are not alien to Afghanistan’s recent history. 
 During the Soviet invasion, the prominent warlords Ahmed Shah Masud and Abdul 
Rashid Dostum used the opium trade to fund their resistance efforts.  Although initially against 
opium production, Masud levied a tax on opium that was paid to local commanders starting at 
2.5 percent.  This tax rose to 20 percent in the 1990s, and with such revenues, the likes of Masud 
and Dostum could strengthen their militias and regional power bases.88  Opium production was 
not the only factor in building these power bases, but it did certainly provide assistance and a 
framework to be repeated after the U.S. invasion in 2001.   
 Unlike the warlordism plaguing Afghanistan after the Soviet Union fled, the Taliban used 
its ties to smuggling networks on the Pakistani border to streamline the trafficking process.  By 
1994, the Taliban pushed warlords away from Spin Boldak, a border in Kandahar’s province, 
and implemented one toll for smugglers instead of the multiple exorbitant tolls used by various 
warlords.89  Although the Taliban taxed farmers, traffickers, and heroin processing labs, their 
control over the opium trade during the 1990s created a more reliable and entrenched network 
for drug traffickers.   
 Opium profits are clearly significant for insurgents and drug traffickers, so much so that 
it is no wonder these actors seek to control the opium economy in Afghanistan.  Although the 
worldwide opium value far outweighs the total money that these groups receive, their shares are 
far greater than landowners, farmers, and migrant workers.  However, the actors that profit the 
most from opium are in a position to influence its production and distribution.  Territorial control 
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becomes a critical factor in maintaining opium production, and the struggle to control territory 
for opium production leads to instability.  While these problems are significant and encourage 
research that addresses issues like “narco-terrorism,” they are a small piece of the illicit opium 
economy in Afghanistan.  There are far more landowners, farmers, and migrant laborers engaged 
in opium production than there are drug traffickers and insurgents.  Understanding the context in 
which the latter groups engage in opium production highlights some of the foundations of 
instability within Afghanistan. 
Landowners, Farmers, and Migrant Laborers 
   While the gross earnings for traffickers and insurgents garner public attention, actors at 
the local level face decisions regarding opium cultivation that are much more troublesome than 
territorial control and earnings potential.  Often, the decision to plant poppies arises out of the 
need for credit, access to land, or some extra income for landowners.  In fact, a major flaw with 
research on opium’s profits focuses on the study of gross incomes.90  Gross incomes of opium 
concentrate on the value of the crop instead of net incomes, which measures the profit after costs 
of production are considered.  At the local level, opium production occurs more frequently 
because of food insecurity, land scarcity, unemployment, and access to credit.91  These issues are 
underscored in the varying amounts of profit that the local level actors receive, and also help to 
explain structural drivers of instability within Afghanistan. 
 First, how much profit do farmers and wage laborers earn?  Opium production requires 
substantial amounts of labor, so even though it can provide substantial employment 
opportunities, more workers reduce the net profits.  About 350 person days are needed to 
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cultivate one hectare of poppy and 200 days for harvesting.92  Compared to only 41 days of 
cultivation for wheat, opium offers more opportunities for employment, especially those without 
access to land.  With these figures, studies that argue for the economic superiority of opium over 
other crops seem less credible.  Sharecroppers and day laborers net several hundred dollars per 
year, while landowners may earn no more than a few thousand dollars.93  These figures dilute the 
potency of opium’s profit potential that the UNODC espouses as key to understanding links 
between transnational organized crime and terrorism.   
 With the limited financial returns that opium cultivation may bring, what compels some 
farmers to produce this crop?  Access to informal credit can ensure the survival of resource-poor 
households.  A critical dilemma throughout Afghanistan, regardless of opium production, 
concerns food insecurity and the need for credit to meet food shortages.94  As a result, because of 
opium’s unique physical attributes and reliable demand, houses that cultivate opium are more 
“creditworthy” than others.  Those farmers that experience preferential treatment due to opium 
receive advance payments on their future opium yield.  In short, regardless of the actual yield, 
farmers collect some profits before harvest time, which allows for the purchase of food, 
medicine, and other necessities.95  Even though this advance payment provides some security, 
the pre-harvest prices of opium are generally lower than their actual value at harvest time, 
leading farmers to secure some income but not the full amount.  This system reinforces the 
systemic problem of food insecurity and client-patron relationships because it does not allow for 
upward mobility and capitalization on the opium crop. 
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Contrasting Provinces 
 These provinces clearly demonstrate the misperceptions regarding the motivation for 
opium production.  Again, the importance of financial returns carries little weight when analyzed 
in the context of both provinces.  Between 2006 and 2007, there was a significant resurgence in 
opium production in Nangarhar.  The 2005 ban on opium production was unsustainable and 
damaged the economic well being of this region.96  In addition, households in Ghor that engage 
in opium production did so in order to survive.  Unlike Nangarhar, residents in Ghor found that 
opium was not profitable due to crop failure and the attractiveness of alternative livelihoods. 
Nangarhar  
Between 2006 and 2007, Nangarhar experienced a revival of opium production after two 
years of steady declines that were in marked contrast to the years prior to this.  In 2004, 
provincial authorities in Nangarhar banned the planting of opium poppies, and in turn affected 
not only farmers but laborers as well.  Laborers without access to land lost as much as $1,000 in 
income while shopkeepers in local bazaars lost business as a secondary effect of the limited 
income of their patrons.  In addition to off-farm income, migrant laborers usually hired to lance 
opium capsules experienced lowered wage rates and lost days of work.  Based on income totals 
before the ban, the province’s wage laborers lost over $11 million.97  The blanket ban on opium 
in 2004 and 2005 disrupted the illicit economy for landless and migrant workers.  While the 
dilemma faced by this group was problematic, households that cultivated opium experienced 
much more hardship.  
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 Certain districts in Nangarhar were better suited to handle the opium ban than others.  
Districts such as Surkhrud, Kama, and Behsud have better access to resources like properly 
irrigated land and larger city-centers.  Although income from opium decreased on land like this, 
these districts benefited from non-opium crops.  A landowner in Behsud could plant rice and 
potatoes, along with other crops that could be sold near Jalalabad and supplement lost income 
from the opium ban.98  Most importantly, basic needs could be met in such districts, and while 
any loss of income can be problematic, it did not result in a cycle of indebtedness and support the 
cycle of informal credit based on opium. 
 In contrast, many farmers in Nangarhar experienced significant hardship because of the 
ban and their lack of resources.  Dependent farmers undertook the most concentrated opium 
production.  Land scarcity and distance from markets like Jalalabad increase the dependence on 
opium poppies because of its natural benefits as outlined in the previous chapter.  Although the 
ban was enforced with 96% success rate in Nangarhar in 2005, it led to wheat becoming a 
replacement for opium.99  Wheat requires substantially less labor than opium and cost some 
farmers five months of extra off-farm wage labor that pays better than wheat production (the 
typical timeframe for an opium growing cycle).  In addition, wheat was insufficient to meet 
household needs because of land density and overpopulation, and these groups increased debts, 
sold off what little resources were available, and lost preferential access to credit that was 
previously used to make ends meet. 
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 Nangarhar’s opium ban, while hailed as a success by the government in 2005, became 
unstable for the resource-poor areas in 2006.  The residents of these areas found three significant 
changes once they returned to opium production.  First, land for sharecropping and renting 
increased dramatically.  This is because opium requires substantial labor and provides 
opportunities for such endeavors, unlike other less intensive crops.  Landowners can afford to 
allot small plots of land to laborers for opium cultivation.  Moreover, the return to opium 
production refreshed farmers’ preferential access to opium-based credit.  Lastly, renewed opium 
production offered wage laborers the attractive growing and harvesting season for relatively high 
wage-labor.100  In contrast, districts close to Jalalabad’s major market did not see as significant a 
return to opium production.  The opium ban of 2005 was enforceable to an extent, but the stress 
on the livelihoods of residents in Nangarhar proved to be too great to sustain it.101  The 
government’s ban was ill-equipped to provide stability in the way the opium economy can.  
However, the transition back to the opium economy does not allow for Nangarhar’s systemic 
problems like land scarcity and food insecurity to be addressed. 
Ghor 
 Unlike Nangarhar, which experienced a reduction and than a rapid increase in opium 
production, Ghor’s level of opium has steadily declined since 2003.  In this province, the decline 
should be attributed to crop failure and loss of profitability instead of more effective anti-drug 
laws.  Interviews in Chaghcharan and Dawlat Yar indicate diseased crops were widespread, 
beginning since 2004.102  Typically, a profitable harvest yields more than seven kilograms of 
opium per jerib of land devoted to cultivation.  However, in the above districts, “few reported 
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receiving the equivalent of more than 1.5 kg of opium per jerib.”103  The poor yields and profits 
stemmed from disease that affected the stem development and subsequently decreased the size of 
opium capsules.  As a result persistently poor yields, farm gate trading decreased substantially as 
Ghor lies directly north of Helmand’s prolific opium production centers. 
 The decrease in opium production relates to the level of resources by its residents, and 
indicates their level of economic security.  The groups that were able to maintain livestock and 
had access to irrigated land made use of wheat instead of opium, in amounts that supported the 
family and fed the livestock.104  Livestock that flourished in Chaghcharan and Dawlat Yar were 
more profitable than opium production, and the abundance of rain-fed land facilitated investment 
in their well-being.  Not only could farmers sell livestock, they also were able to sell ghee 
(butter), qurut (cheese), and wool.105  The income and sustainability that comes with healthy 
livestock serves as an alternative to opium production and indicates the adaptability of farmers in 
Ghor.  
 Though some areas in Ghor could maintain a decrease in opium, the pattern does not 
apply uniformly across the province.  Farmers with irrigated land and livestock could replace 
opium with wheat, vegetables, and feed for their animals.  Unfortunately, land scarcity affects 
the province as it does in Nangarhar.  Some farmers, especially in Awltagarda, increasingly sold 
off their livestock to pay debts and make ends meet.  The groups without access to irrigated land 
or diminished livestock turned to opium despite its poor yields. 106  Since some groups in Ghor 
rely on opium despite its poor performance, their decision to cultivate becomes an issue of 
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survival.  The lack of alternatives, even in a province where opium clearly is not profitable, 
demonstrates that opium production exacerbates instability. 
Conclusion 
 The profitability of opium in Afghanistan is evident, but the profits and their implications 
are certainly contested and basing one’s analysis solely on profit can be misleading.  Obviously 
there are forces that seek to undermine the government, and their profits from opium production 
are significant.  However, this analysis indicates these groups are small in comparison to the 
number of Afghans involved in opium production at the local level, and their profits are 
considerably smaller.  The actual drivers of instability in Afghanistan are systemic problems that 
influence the population and, in part, reinforce dependency on opium as a livelihood.  Opium 
dependency limits upward mobility and serves as band-aid for issues that many farmers and 
landless workers face.  Land scarcity, informal credit, and few viable alternatives are some of the 
reasons Afghans turn to opium as a means of last resort.   
 However, the instances of production in Nangarhar and Ghor call into question another 
troubling aspect of opium production.  Clearly, both provinces demonstrate that opium 
production brings some small degree of economic security for Afghans without resources.  They 
also both explain how the benefits of market access, land owning, and irrigation are some of the 
ways in which Afghans form livelihoods without the crop.  The information gleaned from 
studying local actors’ involvement with opium exemplifies that profits are not the only 
motivator, and that survivability is crucial.  Does this apply to the traffickers and insurgents’ 
motivations for opium production?  While their profit-shares are larger, they benefit from the 
power relations that proliferate opium production in the country. 
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Chapter 5- Power and the Poppy: Power Relationships in 
Afghanistan’s Opium Trade 
 
A problematic theme in foreign policy in Afghanistan focuses on stark perceptions of 
who benefits from opium production.  Some common misconceptions are that the Taliban drives 
the insurgency solely from opium profits, corrupt state actors inhibit “good governance”, and 
farmers cultivate opium because of its financial rewards.  However, the power relationships 
embedded in the opium economy are far more complex than the conventional wisdom assumes.  
First, control of the illicit opium remains contested because of the historically uneven 
relationship between state and non-state actors.  Furthermore, the experience of different types of 
farmers underscores the unequal power relationships among the majority of those involved with 
opium production.  Finally, case studies of Nangarhar, Helmand, and Balkh provide clear 
examples of the influence that uneven power relationships have on opium production and 
stability.  
Background to the Illicit Opium Economy 
 One of the buzzwords associated with the opium economy is political corruption.  
However, this blandishment does not adequately address why the relationship between opium, 
corruption and the state remains uneven.107  Corruption, seen in one way as the misuse of public 
office for one’s benefit (personal or group), can impede effective governing, especially when the 
state is penetrated by predatory criminal structures.  However, some these structures can act as 
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intermediaries between the central government and the periphery during transitions from conflict 
to peace, or at least peace building.108  Vital to this understanding is the kind of relationship 
between state and non-state actors in parts of Afghanistan and knowing that not all non-state 
actors are parts of criminal organizations.   
To begin with, neither state nor non-state actors can easily control opium production, so it 
lends itself to the joint extraction of opium, where both groups stand to benefit from it.  
Afghanistan’s opium economy acts as an illicit economy in that it has different structural 
relations, illicit resources (opium) available to a wide array of actors, the role of international 
actors determines much of the bargaining between state and non state actors, and transactions 
occur outside of official record.109  Furthermore, the power relations that developed in the opium 
economy did so over time and because of capital accumulation, internal and external revenue 
flows, as well as changing internal and external political and military relationships.  Although 
some of the state’s capabilities weaken due to opium production (such as border enforcement or 
aid monitoring), the state also contributed to its development and benefits from the power it 
gains over areas of the country it traditionally has little interaction with.110 While the inclination 
to assail Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, because of his political or familial connections to 
warlords or drug traffickers remains high, this notion must be analyzed carefully.   
During the Soviet invasion between 1979 and 1989, there were enormous amounts of 
military and financial assistance delivered to both sides of the conflict.  The communist regime 
in Afghanistan and the mujahedin both received aid that drastically expanded the war economy 
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while conflict ravaged the country’s infrastructure.  Some of this aid became the initial capital to 
significantly expand opium production, and after the fall of the communist regime, empowered 
some militia commanders to expand smuggling activities.111  This system of private extraction of 
opium and the predatory behavior of warlords during the Afghan Civil War fuelled the initial 
support of the Taliban and led to the second shift in Afghanistan’s illicit economy.  Although 
opium production expanded in the periods during and after the Soviet invasion, the Taliban 
consolidated this process during its reign through de facto legalization.   
Following the U.S. invasion in 2001, several factors influenced relations that further 
changed the dynamics of the illicit economy.  First, the CIA gave Afghan warlords substantial 
monetary assistance for their support against the Taliban.  This in turn depreciated Afghan 
currency and encouraged investment in other enterprises, one of which was opium production.  
In accordance with the flood of money, the U.S. led coalition ignored opium production and 
trafficking much the same way it did during the 1980s.  Following the Bonn Agreement in 
December 2001, opium became criminalized which kept prices high and facilitated unequal 
enforcement of the opium ban.  While the price chain will be elaborated on later, many involved 
in the opium economy sought stability and protection from outside the state.112   
Since Afghanistan’s central government does not effectively reach past the capital in 
Kabul, elites outside of the state bureaucracy retain significant power and independence.  
Because of this, actors in the opium economy can undermine the state and form parallel entities, 
increase patronage and provide for segments of the population in ways the state does not.113 
Furthermore, opium production became a way to accumulate power in the form of political 
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capital.  This form of capital deals with the perceived legitimacy of a person or group and the 
ability to influence the actions of others for political goals.  Since the economic changes from the 
Soviet invasion, namely agricultural subsistence and decentralized government to dependency on 
foreign aid, the Afghan state became a place with intense competition for power.114  State and 
non state actors who seek legitimacy manipulate the opium economy in the form of selective 
banning or approval of opium cultivation.  Furthermore, this process does not universally occur 
throughout the country, but depends on the contextual relationships of certain regions.   
Widespread corruption and a weak central government are the two prominent ways of 
understanding the current Afghan state.  However, the landscape of relationships since the U.S. 
invasion in 2001 does not fully support those assumptions.  For example, customs between Herat 
and the Islam Qala post near Iran generate upwards of $100 million per year in official trade 
revenues.  Unlike Heart, northern Afghanistan remains factionalized by competing groups.  This 
fragmentation of political, social, and economic relationships pushes farmers and merchants into 
the fold of these factions if they wish to conduct business.115  These brief descriptions are 
strongly regional and local, but they highlight the uneven relationship between actors and 
institutions in Afghanistan.  Most importantly, opium production’s influence in certain regions 
resembles this as it enhances the power of some actors and diminishes that of others.  It also 
highlights the varying degrees of complexity that underscore stability in the country. 
Farmers, Warlords, and Strongmen: Different Roles, Resources and Access to Power 
 Before addressing the different Afghan farmers that constitute the majority of actors 
involved in opium production, three individuals who benefit from the above power relationships 
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merit closer analysis.  Atta Mohammad Noor and Gul Agha Shirzai are the provincial governors 
of Balkh and Nangarhar, respectively, and both are recognized for delivering measures of 
stability.  Governor Atta previously served as a Tajik militia commander under the revered 
Ahmed Shah Massoud and calls Balkh his home and began governing in 2004.  Governor Shirzai 
was a Pashtun milita commander from Kandarhar but began governing Nangarhar in 2005.  
While both provinces are quite different in terms of governance, geography, security, and opium 
production, both governors and provinces represent vital interests to international actors in 
Afghanistan. The illicit power relations described in the previous section underscore the need for 
these actors to leverage relationships and resources outside of the state in order to gain control of 
their provinces.116   
 Beginning with Governor Atta of Balkh, literature suggests he utilizes a monopoly of 
violence to maintain order in the province.  The governor joined forces with the U.S. during its 
invasion in 2001 and assisted with wresting Mazar-i-Sharif from Taliban control and proving to 
be a valuable ally to the U.S. and Hamid Karzai.  After becoming governor, Atta placed many of 
his militia commanders in provincial government roles and within police ranks.117  The fortuitous 
placement of allies and potential rivals demonstrates the capability to maintain relative security 
in Balkh.  The newly appointed provincial actors are allied with Atta and do not stand to benefit 
from destabilizing the region.   
 Although a previous militia commander, Governor Shirzai’s role in Nangarhar contains 
key differences when compared to Atta.  Shirzai hails from Kandarhar and did not enjoy the 
previously established network that Atta, the Balkh native, has.  Furthermore, tribal politics are 
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much more important than in Balkh and Jalalabad serves as a major supply location for NATO 
forces.  While Atta uses a monopoly of violence, Shirzai co-opts tribal leaders in order to gain 
political capital and legitimacy.118  Some examples of Shirzai’s actions can be seen in 
Nangarhar’s most recent opium cultivations.  Shirzai was able to use funding to supply tribal 
elders with food, capital for schools and mosques, construction projects, and discretionary 
funding.119  For these gifts, the governor required that the tribal elders disseminate the 
counternarcotics message to their constituents and off public guarantees to comply with the laws. 
 Another important actor more directly involved in opium production, and authorized to 
use state power, is Colonel Abdul Razik, the border police commander of Spin Boldak.  Spin 
Boldak lies on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan in Kandahar’s province and is a major 
transaction point for licit and illicit goods.120  According to Matthieu Aikins of Harper’s 
Magazine, his time in Spin Boldak, the city was safer than Kandahar City and, despite lacking 
resources, was relatively secure.  With the border police engaging in smuggling and drug 
trafficking, economic stability is a byproduct of Razik’s support.121  While Colonel Razik 
partially deserves exception, the three actors utilize illicit power relations to accumulate political 
capital.  And although the above descriptions lauded the small measures of security they brought 
to their respective locus of control, they are certainly not without their own problems.  As the 
rest of this chapter shall demonstrate, the livelihoods of farmers in these provinces are insecure 
and perceptions of the governors and law enforcement are eroding stability and facilitating 
increased instability. 
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 Unlike the powerbrokers described above, famers, landowners, and wage laborers 
comprise the majority of those involved in opium production.  Moreover, the context of rural 
livelihood strategies must be analyzed to understand how power relations influences decisions on 
opium cultivation and stability.  First, the unit of measurement that most aptly addresses what 
kind of local actors engage in opium production is the household.  As noted in earlier chapters, 
the geography and access to resources determine patters of cultivation, but access to resources 
most significantly factors into a household’s livelihood strategy.122  Furthermore, Afghan 
households contain extended family members and it is not uncommon to find upwards of 15 
family members living in one home.  Like family size, wealthier landowners may own 
approximately 300 jeribs of land whereas other families may utilize sharecropping 
agreements.123  Clearly the household unit of measurement is diverse and underscores the need to 
move away from assuming all farmers cultivate opium with similar capabilities. 
 Like the size of families and their land, types of off-farm and non-farm income factor 
strongly into rural livelihood strategies.  Off-farm income usually denotes wage labor on another 
farm whereas non-farm income refers to sources of income outside of agricultural enterprises.124  
A household that lies near a major urban center and owns more land may have access to non-
farm income in the form of government salaries and retail.  These forms of income can be more 
reliable than agriculture because they are not as likely to feel the adverse effects of droughts and 
price shortages.125  In contrast, off-farm income generally encompasses lower-wage labor, 
sometimes seasonally during opium harvests and as a means to access credit.  Clearly, the scope 
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of engagement with opium depends on the household’s resources at hand and should be analyzed 
as a livelihood strategy.  Since the livelihood strategy officially carries an “illicit” designation, it 
remains a risky venture for both local actors with and without resources. 
 Another key measurement in determining the lack of power for some local actors lies in 
their dependency on opium.  Research indicates that the diversity of opportunity that a household 
has inversely impacts its dependence on opium.126  For example, a household with limited access 
to resources would be more likely to rely on opium for its basic needs.  Rural areas with high 
poverty generally experience more intensive opium production as a survival mechanism, 
including wage labor associated with seasonal opium harvesting.  In contrast, households with 
more resources have a lower dependency on opium because they are located near larger market 
centers for labor and commodities, contain better security, and offer the opportunity to use opium 
production as an income boost.127  Policies that view households as either “opium-growing” or 
“non-opium growing” lack this analysis of the dynamics of opium dependency and undermine 
the instability that faces resource-poor Afghans. 
 Another integral part of the rural livelihood strategy is access to credit.  Seasonal credit 
can be acquired as an advance on a predetermined amount of agricultural crops, and since the 
Soviet invasion opium has been the crop of choice because of the high external demand for it.128  
While this informal credit system is common, households with very few resources sell their 
entire lot of opium prior to harvest, but only receive a fraction of the harvest price.129 Obviously 
this system does not favor the poorest households in Afghanistan and it seems unlikely anyone 
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would willingly sell their crop for less than its value, but resource-poor Afghans face truly dire 
circumstances.  Often the informal credit affords the resource poor access to clothes, medicine, 
foodstuffs, and agricultural inputs.  The informal credit system that favors opium drastically 
limits upward mobility of the resource poor and dispels the myth that all farmers cultivate opium 
for its profitability.   
 As noted earlier, Governor Shirzai utilized connections with tribal elites to enforce the 
opium ban in Nangarhar in 2005.  The limits of this effort are apparent when considering the 
household’s capacity to respond to shocks in the illicit economy such as banning opium or 
eradication.  Resource-wealthy households have a higher opportunity cost when faced with 
eradication, especially if arrest is a possible consequence of harvesting opium.  Instead of using 
opium as an income boost to their more diverse profile of crops, that land may be used for more 
licit crops that, as seen in the profit chapter, rival or surpass opium in profitability.130  However, 
opium-dependent households that have few alternatives because of limited land for agriculture 
and decreased market access do not experience a higher opportunity cost.  Of course eradication 
may ruin that harvest, but what other option is there?  As the case studies shall point out, the 
threat of eradication depends on the scope and implementation of the ban.   
 The importance of framing the context in which opium production influences the rural 
livelihood of various types of Afghan farmers cannot be overstated.  Obviously the instability in 
livelihood strategies stems from a variety of factors, including land scarcity, inaccessible 
geography, distant markets, and poor infrastructure to name a few.  It should also be obvious that 
blanket bans and eradication do far more harm than good for local actors.  However, even the 
idea that allowing opium production to occur because it serves as a harbinger of economic 
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stability can be misleading.  Yes, for some Afghans it does produce significant income streams 
and bolsters assets.  However, for the increasingly marginalized rural population it barely serves 
as a survival mechanism, especially when access to credit is denied and basic necessities are 
inaccessible.131  The varied levels of resources among local actors determines the dependency on 
opium production, and for those that are opium-dependent, the lack of agency to break from this 
dependence is reinforced by the existing power relations within the opium economy.   
Case Studies of Three Provinces: Balkh, Nangarhar, and Helmand 
 Thus far the analysis of power relations focuses on the structure of the illicit economy 
and the various actors who gain power within it.  However, the following case studies clearly 
portray the dynamics of these power relations in specific provinces.  Balkh, Nangarhar, and 
Helmand are useful because different factors have influenced opium production and stability 
within these regions.  The political settlement between state and non-state actors, the impact of 
opium production, and the collusion between different groups regarding opium production has 
varied in each region.  As a consequence, each region receives interacts with external forces 
differently, and most importantly, one can see the way instability is framed in each region. 
Balkh 
 This is an ethnically diverse province in the north Afghanistan.  With a little over one 
million people, Balkh contains Tajiks, Pashtuns, Turks, and Uzbeks.132  Governor Atta, a former 
Jaimat-e Islami militia commander, leveraged his position as an ally of President Karzai to 
become governor and place many of his commanders into governmental roles.  Atta also has 
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been able to hold on to his position of power because of the official revenues that the province 
supplies to the central government.  Mazar-e-Sharif, the provincial capital, is a major economic 
center with a state-run fertilizer plant and relatively productive labor market.133  Through Balkh, 
Afghanistan imports hundreds of millions of dollars in goods from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  
The number of imports for between these two countries has risen dramatically since 2007, with 
2009 seeing $165 million and $501 million from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, respectively.134   
 With substantial official trade revenues, why was there a surge in opium production in 
2005 in Balkh, where historically hashish has been produced in greater quantities than opium?  
One aspect of this change can be explained through labor migration.  After the opium ban in 
Nangarhar was implemented in 2005, wage laborers traveled to Balkh for seasonal work during 
the opium harvest.135  Another important reason why opium production increased was the 
penetration of opium markets into the north from traders in the south.136  The changes labor and 
the need to migrate for seasonal wage labor and the ban in Nangarhar occur at the same time 
opium production rose in Balkh and supports the notion that the resource-poor in Nangarhar 
would travel for this type of work. 
 Governor Atta’s ability to enforce a new ban on opium in Balkh in 2006 and 2007 came 
from his control over the Jaimat-e Islami militia he previously commanded and his political 
support from Hamid Karzai.  A critical problem that Governor Atta inherited was the lack of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  Ibid.,	  23.	  
134	  See	  Appendix	  D.	  	  Afghanistan	  Central	  Statistics	  Office	  “Exports	  and	  Imports	  by	  Countries	  (US$	  Millions)	  1999-­‐
2009.”	  	  http://www.cso.gov.af/economics/services/trade.html	  (2010).	  	  
135	  Goodhand	  and	  Mansfield,	  “Drugs	  &	  (Dis)Order,”25.	  
136	  Adam	  Pain,	  “The	  Diffusion	  and	  Spread	  of	  Opium	  Poppy	  Cultivation	  in	  Balkh:	  A	  Report	  for	  AREU’s	  Applied	  
Thematic	  Research	  into	  Water,	  Management,	  Livestock	  and	  the	  Opium	  Economy.”	  Afghanistan	  Research	  and	  
Evaluation	  Unit,	  (Kabul,	  2007).	  
64	  
	  
development assistance promised to him in the wake of hi opium ban.137  The increased difficulty 
of opium production coupled with broken promises of development assistance during 2007 and 
2008 contributed to the now tenuous political position of Governor and the increased instability 
in the province.  While Balkh is not known for its opium production, the early increase then 
decline from Governor Atta’s ban indicates the power in which he held over the province.  
However, the position seems to have become untenable as security has declined and the 
continued lack of development assistance. 
Nangarhar 
 Unlike Balkh, Nangarhar has received substantial investments from the U.S. since the fall 
of the Taliban in 2001.  The Alternative Development Programme, aimed at providing different 
livelihoods for opium farmers, alone contributed $118 million to Nangarhar between 2005 and 
2009, 2005 being the initial year of the opium ban there.138  Other investments from the 
European Union include the National Priority Programmes like National Solidarity Porgramme, 
the Micro Finance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan, and the Comprehensive Rural 
Agricultural Development Facility program.  These initiatives clearly demonstrate the interest 
that the international community has in certain places in Afghanistan, but still the ban on opium 
production demonstrates the limited efficacy of these programs and the dire circumstances of 
marginalized Afghans. 
 Opium production experiences substantial fluctuations in Nangarhar.  The 2004 and 2005 
growing seasons saw enormous reductions in opium production, as little as over 1,000 hectares 
in the province of almost 2 million people.  This occurred because of the aforementioned 
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development initiatives and engagement between provincial administration and tribal elders.  As 
mentioned before, Governor Shirzai utilized his access to development funds to gain preferential 
support from the tribal elders in order to enforce the ban.  However, with little changing for 
Afghan farmers and continued placement of Shirzai’s allies on government roles, the governor’s 
support began to dwindle in the province.  Aside from the towns and villages close to Jalalabad, 
serious economic hardship afflicted many farmers after four years of opium bans.139  A 
surprising result from this was that Nangarhar witnessed higher enlistment rates in the Afghan 
National Army in 2009 and early 2010.  These enlistments symbolize a coping strategy since the 
alternatives for resource-poor Afghans are extremely limited in Nangarhar.140 
 A striking example of the effects of the opium ban and external actors in Nangarhar is the 
land dispute in Achin.  In early 2010, U.S. signed an “Anti-Taliban Shinwari Pact” with elders 
from the Shinwari tribe in Nangarhar.141  About 400,000 people constitute the Shinwari tribe, 
and the pact guarantees their support against the Taliban and offers stiff punishments for Taliban 
sympathizers.  The pact embodies the illicit power relations in Afghanistan in that the U.S. 
bypassed the Karzai government and promised aid and support directly to this tribe.  The dispute 
is between two sub-tribes, the Sepoy and the Alisherkhel.  Originally, the land belonged to no 
one until Malik Niaz, a Sepoy tribal elder, was armed and financed by the Governor Shirzai 
following a firefight with Niaz’s tribal fighters and the Taliban.142  After this supply, Niaz set up 
tents on the disputed land, was protected by the Afghan National Police (assuming the tacit 
approval of Governor Shirzai) and built homes in the area with new construction materials. 
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 The Alisherkhel tribe, which claims this land area, had never been in dispute until Malik 
Niaz and the Sepoy tribe had the wherewithal to occupy it, thanks to the support from the U.S. 
and the blessing of Governor Shirzai.  Eventually, the Alisherkhel and the Sepoy fought each 
other over the disputed area with varying accounts of casualties.  Unfortunately, in order to settle 
the dispute more sub-tribes within the Shinwari were drawn into a three hundred-person jirga.  
Furthermore, to guarantee the peace for the jirga the Sepoy and Alisherkhel contributed 40 
million Pakistan Rupees (PR).  Although the case has not been settled, this has provoked 
substantial concern among the larger Shinwari.  The Shinwari are committed to the U.S., but the 
Taliban have made inroads with the Alisherkhel and offered protection against the Sepoy, a clear 
violation of the pact.143 
 Clearly the provision of aid and arms directly to the Shinwari tribe caused hostilities that 
did not exist before.  Moreover, the Taliban wisely used this event to make inroads into the 
Alisherkhel tribe and destabilize the Anti-Taliban pact.  In addition, the context of this dispute 
should not be overlooked.  The land dispute occurred after five consecutive opium bans.  While 
opium is still cultivated, the active banning of it limits the amount of off-farm income available 
to marginalized Afghans.  Furthermore, the 40 million PR came from a tax on the people of 
Achin in the amount of 6,000 per married family.144  The combination of a new tax and the loss 
of seasonal wages due to the opium ban places even more stress on resource-poor families.  In 
this context, the Taliban’s offer of protection does not seem unreasonable if one considers the 
perspective of certain Afghan households. 
Helmand 
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 The largest province of Afghanistan, Helmand occupies the southwest portion of the 
country and borders Pakistan and Baluchistan.  Helmand’s most productive agriculture occurs 
near the Helmand River but land outside of this area offers far less valuable farming.145  Since 
the Helmand River Dam and irrigation systems were destroyed during the Soviet invasion, the 
steep inclines of mountains, dry desert spaces, and poor soil have limited agricultural 
opportunities.  In addition to its geographical issues, the biggest agricultural market for Helmand 
is Kandahar City in Kandahar, which requires long and insecure travel periods.146  While media 
portrayals of Helmand illustrate a hotbed of insurgency, some contextual background 
complicates this notion. 
 Unlike the Balkh’s official trade revenues, the border with Pakistan and Baluchistan does 
not provide any official trade revenues.  All trade around this border is smuggling of some kind.  
It follows then, that the provincial authorities in this region stand to benefit from the unofficial 
revenues on smuggling all sorts of goods, including opium.147  Another important aspect of 
Helmand’s political settlement to consider is that the Taliban’s roots are along these borders and 
they ejected many former warlords that are once again in positions of power as provincial 
authorities.  The likes of Sher Mohammed Akhundzada, Abdul Rahman Jan and Mir Wali are 
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part of the reason why the Taliban enjoyed initial support in the early 1990s, and now these men 
are back.148  After the Taliban were ousted in 2001, Helmand experienced a serious lack of 
development assistance, thus smoothing the way for the Taliban to re-enter the province and 
further destabilize relations with those that support the Karzai government. 
 With this information at hand, the popular link of opium production and insurgent 
activity does not seem as straightforward as it appears.  There are clear reasons as to why the 
Taliban were able to swiftly return to Helmand and continue destabilizing the U.S. and the 
Karzai government.  Furthermore, the already depressed economic and agricultural situation 
becomes exacerbated by violence and the predatory behavior of armed actors, state and non-state 
alike.  Farmers who wish to cultivate wheat, fruit and vegetables have to travel to major markets 
like Kandahar City, whereas an opium farmer can sell from the farmgate to someone who can 
afford the transportation and utilize the political capital to protect the passage.149  This recurring 
insecurity makes the choice to cultivate opium a rational one. 
 The perception that the Taliban are narco-terrorists becomes further complicated when 
the roles of state actors are considered.  Colonel Razik of Spin Boldak, the border police 
commander mentioned earlier, may be able to provide effective security to U.S. military 
personnel, but he also presents a clear double standard to Afghan farmers.  Furthermore, the 
official revenues produced in Helmand are far less than in Balkh or Nangarhar, but opium 
production is far greater here and there are few development projects to hail as successes.  
Clearly, the unofficial movement of goods across the border and the large amounts of opium 
being produced indicate some form of collusion among state and non-state actors.  While 
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Helmand experiences substantial military engagements, the rural population are not wrong in 
perceiving the insurgency as driven by colluding state and non-state actors that clearly benefit 
from opium. 
Conclusion 
 Although the three provinces are unique, they all highlight significant aspects of opium 
production in Afghanistan.  Clearly, there are power relations at work that are inside and outside 
of the opium economy and not always locally generated.  Within it, opium is profitable based 
primarily on the access to a variety of resources if you are a farmer and offers even more if you 
are higher in the process, as traffickers and insurgents are.  Furthermore, the opium trade clearly 
is different in each of the three provinces, let alone the rest of the country.  One thing that each 
province shares is that the opium economy is a means to accumulate power.   
In Balkh, the monopoly of violence allowed Governor Atta to establish himself as a 
strong ally of President Karzai and implement a ban on opium, although that position seems to 
be dwindling.  Nangarhar demonstrates that the illicit social power of tribal elders can be used to 
initiate opium bans and anti-Taliban pacts, but these have consequences.  As we have seen, 
opium serves as a rural livelihood mechanism and after successive years of active prohibition, 
the Governor’s position is failing and the Taliban are taking advantage of unintended 
consequences of the ban like the land dispute in Achin.  Finally, Helmand demonstrates that 
opium production not only serves as rural livelihood but also systemically fuels state and non-
state collusion, where these actors clearly benefit from the ongoing insurgency. 
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Chapter 6- Transnational Networks, the Value Chain, and the 
Complicity of External Actors in the Expansion of Opium 
Production 
 Thus far the analysis of opium production focuses on diverse aspects Afghanistan’s 
geography, profits, and the structural power relations that drive opium.  Furthermore, this 
research criticizes the narrow approach that many institutions use to analyze opium in 
Afghanistan. Reports that do not address opium dependency for some farmers and the myth that 
opium is profitable for all those involved clearly are lacking a contextual understanding of 
Afghanistan’s illicit economy.  However, these same reports are correct in noting that Afghan 
opium travels extensively.  This begs the question: What are the transnational networks of opium 
production and how are they sustained?  This chapter analyzes the networks that distribute opium 
out of Afghanistan and into countries with high demands for heroin.  
 In order to understand this process, there are several facets of the external drug trade that 
must be analyzed.  Previous chapters address the myth that opium generates profits for all 
farmers involved, but the drug trade still remains highly lucrative.  Therefore, the value chain 
process of price changes between the farmgate values to an external market like Eastern Europe 
must be analyzed.  This analysis demonstrates how and why opium prices rise so dramatically 
outside of Afghanistan.  Another critical part of this value chain examines the complicity of 
external countries in sustaining and expanding the transnational networks and prices.  Here, the 
criminality of opium production and drug enforcement plays an integral role in the high prices.  
This analysis, combined with figures on returning refugees in Afghanistan, demonstrates the 
sustainment of opium production in Afghanistan and the expansion outside of it. 
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Value Chain Analysis 
 The profit from illicit drug production anywhere chiefly stems from its prohibition.  
Some of the costs of production for illegal drugs involve labor, transportation and places to 
cultivate illicit crops.  In addition, these costs are driven higher by illegality because bribes, the 
use of violence, and the possibility of arrest increase the risk premium of engaging in illegal 
activities.150  The value chain of opium in Afghanistan begins at the farmgate.  Previous chapters 
demonstrate that an Afghan cultivator sells the crop at low prices, and often those involved in the 
cultivation do so as a means of credit.  Once opium traders buy at the farmgate, they sell the 
product to larger-volume traffickers at opium bazaars and smugglers take the product to the 
border where the majority of heroin processing occurs (although this has increased within 
Afghanistan since 2001).   
 At this stage, there are several reasons why opium’s price skyrockets.  Farmers can be 
taxed on their agricultural products, eradicators are paid off in certain areas to selectively enforce 
an opium ban, opium traders have to bribe police, district officials, or political representatives for 
protection.151  At border points where opium gets processed into heroin, the processing controller 
has even more payments to make.  Territorial control becomes a significant cost for these actors 
and tax must be paid to the local warlord or strongman, Taliban representative, or government 
official to tacitly approve of the process.  Opium processing requires precursor chemicals, 
chiefly acetic anhydride, and this must be brought to the processing location.152  This in turn 
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requires similar costs that opium traders incur when they go to buy opium and smuggle it, except 
this happens mostly outside of Afghanistan or near its borders.  Heroin also must be protected as 
it transfers to the market because of its illegality.  Border crossing, airfields, and waterways are 
some of the expensive ways in which heroin makes it out of processing stations and onto larger 
drug markets. 
 In addition to the costs that go into the purchasing of opium and manufacture of heroin, 
counternarcotics policies also affect these prices and destabilize areas where they are enforced. 
Clearly the marginalized and resource-poor farmer or laborer bears the risk of opium production 
because the opportunity cost for them is not high.  However, the overall impact of 
counternarcotics policies such as eradication or alternative livelihood development requires more 
analysis.  One school of thought states that if the supply gets cut off, then drug trafficking shall 
decrease.  Unfortunately, this system contains flaws that actually have the opposite effect. 
 Eradication targets the cultivators of opium, in some cases wealthy landowners who have 
a high opportunity cost but more often than not it is the resource-poor farmers who suffer.  
Unlike the wealthier or politically connected landowners, resource-poor farmers either cannot 
afford bribes and lose their crop or lose the wage labor opportunity from opium harvesting.153  
Furthermore, eradication aims to lower the amount of opium supplied to traffickers thus lowering 
their revenue and encourages the wealthier landowners to plant something else.  Eradication’s 
major flaw is that it actually raises the revenues of traffickers, thereby encouraging actions that 
facilitate opium cultivation, such as selective enforcement and bribery.154  So while the resource-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Ibid.,	  24.	  
154	  Ibid	  p	  25-­‐26.	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poor may be harmed and left with no recourse, the status quo does not change for other actors in 
the chain. 
 Consequently, eradication results in higher levels of instability for the actors that cannot 
afford bribes, plant other crops, or lose wage labor opportunities.  Moreover, these actors make 
up a large portion of the opium production process.  As the previous chapter demonstrates, most 
Afghan farmers or wage laborers engage in opium production because of its role in their 
livelihood.  Eradication only serves to further destabilize this livelihood.  At the same time, 
selective enforcement portrays state actors as guilty, illegitimate, and makes undermines stability 
and support for these actors.  The following tables illustrate the value chain prices in Afghan 
opium and why the opium economy survives. 
Table 1 
1 kg of Afghan 
Opium 
2002 Value 
($US) 
2008 Value 
($US) 
%Value 
Increase 
Between 
Farmgate and 
Border 2002 
%Value 
Increase 
Between 
Farmgate and 
Border 2008 
Afghanistan-
Iran Border 
5,000 3,270 1,401% 3,342% 
Afghanistan-
Pakistan Border 
4,110 3,256 1,134% 3,327% 
Afghanistan-
Tajikistan 
Border 
4,540 3,150 1,236% 3,215% 
Average 
Farmgate Price 
in Afghanistan 
333 95 - - 
155 
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  Statistics	  are	  from	  UNODC	  report	  “Addiction,	  Crime	  and	  Insurgency:	  The	  Transnational	  Threat	  of	  Afghan	  
Opium.”	  UNDOC,	  (October,	  2009).	  	  The	  report	  displays	  the	  average	  farmgate	  price	  and	  the	  border	  price,	  but	  does	  
not	  address	  the	  price	  markup	  from	  farmgate	  to	  border.	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Table 2 
156  
 The above graphics demonstrate several key factors about the price change and the 
complicity of external actors in Afghanistan’s opium economy.  First, Table 1 shows a dramatic 
difference between farmgate and border prices in 1 kilogram of opium.  The value increase 
clearly underscores the fact that opium does not seem as profitable for farmers as was once 
thought, and explains why those higher along the value chain would benefit from its continued 
expansion.  Furthermore, the difference between the 2002 and 2008 values at the border are 
substantial, but 2008 value change is greater than in 2002 when prices were higher.  Even though 
opium prices fell overall in 2008, the value change increased substantially.  This demonstrates 
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  Ibid.,	  66.	  	  Again,	  the	  price	  analysis	  in	  the	  UNODC	  report	  indicates	  these	  prices	  at	  each	  level,	  but	  does	  not	  
compare	  them	  in	  a	  value	  chain	  format.	  	  The	  contrast	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  accepted	  estimate	  of	  price	  ratios,	  
where	  ten	  kilograms	  of	  opium	  produces	  one	  kilogram	  of	  heroin.	  	  	  
2008	  Average	  
Farmgate	  
Value	  of	  10kg	  
of	  Afghan	  
Opium	  =	  
$950	  
2008	  Value	  of	  
10kg	  of	  
Afghan	  
Opium	  at	  
Afghanistan-­‐
Pakistan	  
Border=	  
$30,256	  
2008	  Value	  of	  
1kg	  of	  Heroin	  
(Aker	  Opium	  
Processing)	  in	  
Eastern	  
Europe=	  ~
$150,000-­‐
$170,000	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that the farmgate seller receives far less than what a trafficker earns at the border and it also 
questions the validity of the premise that all farmers cultivate opium for its profitability. 
 Furthermore, Table 2 signifies the complicity of other countries in this process.  
Afghanistan’s farmgate value does not amount to much.  The border price rises dramatically but 
it is the price on the Eastern European market that truly denounces the current drug laws in 
external countries.  The farmgate price of $950 in 2008 to a conservative market price at 
$150,000 indicates the enormously lucrative opportunity for those that control the drug trade.  
Even though the finished products in the graphic are different, it underscores that those at the 
bottom of the value chain, the farmers and wage laborers, receive the smallest portion of the 
available profits.  Also, the activities required in bringing heroin to the market, and their 
subsequent illegality, help to determine this exorbitant price.  With this contrast set forth, it 
becomes clear why the ineffective enforcement strategies of external countries not only fail to 
limit drug trafficking and consumption, they target those at the lowest end of the value chain and 
also fuel the macro-level systems that contribute to Afghanistan’s opium economy. 
Opium Networks in Afghanistan 
 Another important piece of Afghanistan’s opium economy consider focuses on its 
established networks that opium travels on and the consequences of enforcing bans on what 
goods can and cannot travel across them.  To begin with, a clarification needs to be made 
regarding networks within Afghanistan.  The UNODC lauds “poppy-free” provinces, but does 
not consider the migration of work between the north, south, and east.  With the more effective 
opium bans in northern Afghanistan, wage laborers travel east and south in search of work 
during harvest seasons.  Outside of Afghanistan, opium travels to Pakistan via the Northwest 
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Frontier Province and Balochistan.  The Baloch area of Pakistan shares a 1,200 kilometer border 
with Afghanistan, including Helmand and Kandahar provinces.  From Pakistan, heroin travels 
into India through Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat.  The train system of Samjhauta Express 
between Lahore, Pakistan and Amritsar, India has been a primary transit point for drug 
traffickers.157   
 Furthermore, Iran and Central Asia are also transit points for Afghan opium.  Iran borders 
Pakistan and Afghanistan and also serves the European market for heroin.158  In addition, the 
Iranian coast presents a useful maritime trafficking avenue and the smuggling networks 
established in Iraq have begun to smuggle heroin due to weakened security along Iraq’s borders 
since the U.S. invasion in 2003.  As far as Central Asian countries are concerned, Tajikistan 
accounts for most of the heroin that travels to Eastern Europe and Russia.  The breakdown of 
security during Tajikistan’s civil war between 1992 and 1997 coincided with the increased 
opium production in Afghanistan at the time, thus facilitating trafficking between the 
countries.159  The delineation of these networks helps to conceive the routes that Afghan opium 
takes into external markets, but an overlooked aspect of these networks deals with illegality 
along the borders. 
The Afghan opium economy’s border trade not only reaches many external countries, the 
illegality of opium changes the relationships of those that utilize these borders.  For example, 
Heart imports and exports numerous goods to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and those are counted 
as official revenues.  However, opium production plays a central role in the actors engaged in it 
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  Chouvy,	  Opium:	  Uncovering	  the	  Politics	  of	  the	  Poppy,	  84-­‐85.	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  Ibid.,	  85.	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  Ibid.,	  86-­‐88.	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are not trading, they are illegally smuggling.160  The previous chapter explained that Helmand 
did not produce any official revenues from its border, but substantial revenues are accrued by the 
border police and strongmen that operate near main roads.  The selective enforcement of goods 
across certain borders means that someone will have to pay to avoid this law, thus allowing for 
unofficial revenues to be earned by those entrusted with border enforcement.161   
In addition to the illegality that affects relationships, the concept of trafficking routes and 
its opposite, border enforcement and systems to limit access, can be seen as mechanisms for 
power.  While the previous chapter demonstrates that state and non-state actors may compete for 
control over opium production, they can also compete for control over these routes, where large 
profits are available with regard to opium.162  The consequences of this are twofold: state and 
non-state actors compete for control in ways that encourage armed conflict and increase 
instability, or they mutually benefit from each other but perpetuate the relationships that 
marginalize Afghans with limited access to resources. 
Refugees 
 While the return of Afghan refugees does not consider extensive opium networks, the 
sheer number of returnees has potential consequences for opium production.  The unemployment 
levels in Afghanistan are high, with over half of the capable workforce out of jobs.163  In 
addition, there are large numbers of Afghans returning to the country since the U.S. invasion in 
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  Ibid.,	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  Ibid.,	  91.	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  Michael	  Nicoletti	  INT	  500	  “The	  Return	  of	  Afghanistan’s	  Refugees	  since	  2000:	  Unemployment	  and	  the	  Rise	  in	  
Opium	  Production”	  Dr.	  Shailja	  Sharma	  DePaul	  University	  June	  2009	  p	  8.	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  retrieved	  from	  "UNHCR Global 
Report 2007-Afghanistan." United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 1 June 2008. Web. 16 Nov. 2009. 
<http://www.unhcr.org>. 
	  
78	  
	  
2001, as Tables 3 and 4 illustrate.  These tables demonstrate that Afghanistan experiences 
substantial refugee flows, and combined with the overall unemployment rate, the potential for 
these returning a refugee to engage in opium production seems high.  It also indicates the scale in 
which the amount of social and family ties was disrupted.  Furthermore, in areas where opium 
production is prohibited, many of the returnees have since left Afghanistan for Pakistan or Iran in 
search of employment.164   
Recorded	  Years	  of	  Afghan	  Refugees	  returning	  from	  Pakistan	  and	  Iran	  
	  
2000	   292,500	  
2001	   26,000	  
2002	   1,792,500	  
2003	   644,900	  
2004	   939,700	  
2005	   750,700	  
2006	   387,800	  
2007	   373,900	  
 
Refugee	  Situation	  as	  of	  January	  2010	  
	  
Refugee	  Context	   Number	  of	  Refugees	  
Refugees	   2,887,123	  
Asylum	  Seekers	   30,412	  
Returned	  Refugees	   57,582	  
Internally	  Displaced	  People	   297,129	  
Returned	  IDPs	   7,225	  
Total	   3,279,471	  
 
  Afghanistan’s opium economy contains diverse internal dynamics that influence farmers’ 
decisions to cultivate opium.  However, the counternarcotics policies of external countries 
drastically increase the price of opium as it leaves Afghanistan.  Moreover, marginalized farmers 
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and laborers bear the brunt of eradication policies as these policies target them and actually 
increase the revenues available for those higher in the value chain.  The value chain analysis 
clearly demonstrates the complicity of external countries, intentional or not, in the sustainment 
and expansion of the opium trade.  It also fosters the collusion between state and non-state actors 
that is wrongly attributed to the inherent nature of the drug trade, when in reality this relationship 
grows because of the criminality of opium and the high prices that result from ineffective 
enforcement. 
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Chapter 7- Conclusion 
 The goal of this research is to present readers with a critical understanding of the context 
of opium production in Afghanistan.  Another significant piece of this research is to evaluate the 
relationship between instability and opium production in Afghanistan.  The most effective way to 
undertake this effort was to analyze the relationship between the political, social, and economic 
history of Afghanistan and its illicit opium economy, with a focus on the latter’s dynamic and 
changing role.  I have laid out the physical properties of the poppy, its monetary profits, the 
power relationships, and the transnational networks of the opium trade.  Within this analysis, 
several conclusions and recommendations can be offered for future research on opium in 
Afghanistan. 
 Overall, opium production in Afghanistan became a rural livelihood strategy for several 
reasons.  First, the country’s state of permanent warfare altered political, social, and economic 
relations prior to the Soviet invasion.  The country was predominantly rural and isolated from a 
central state with limited economic wealth.  However, armed conflict increased urbanization, 
forced migration, destroyed arable land and infrastructure, disrupted long-standing kinship 
networks, ushered in the Mujahedin, the Taliban, and flooded a mostly subsistence economy 
with money and weapons.  With these changes in mind, opium production became a viable rural 
livelihood strategy because of its physical properties, Afghanistan’s geography, and the dynamic 
profits, power, and networks associated with opium production. 
 First, the notion that opium profits motivate farmers to cultivate the crop must be 
abandoned.  Each chapter’s focus dispels this myth.  The poppy plant has certain physical 
properties that make it an attractive crop for farmers.  Also, the poppy travels easily and can be 
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stored for long periods of time and also provides ample opportunities for wage labor.  
Furthermore, the geography of Afghanistan and access to market centers also plays a crucial role 
in a farmer’s determination to cultivate crops.  Opium is not always more profitable than licit 
crops and usually only the very resource-poor solely cultivate this whereas others take advantage 
of more diverse crop portfolios. 
 The truth is that basing an analysis solely on profits from opium and ignoring the context 
of geography and power relations dilutes the quality of one’s analysis.  Yes, the global drug trade 
is enormously profitable, but not for the majority of those involved with opium production in 
Afghanistan.  Afghan farmers are diverse in their own right, with not everyone only growing 
opium or utilizing crop substitution as a viable alternative.  Farmers with more wealth and 
nearby market centers can multi-crop and hire workers in land sharing agreements.  However, 
marginalized and resource-poor Afghans often cultivate opium as a means of access to credit.  
These groups receive a fraction of the price of the final crop before they harvest as a method to 
make ends meet.  In this context, opium is a rural livelihood strategy that is highly dependent on 
resources such as favorable geography, access to irrigated land and thriving markets, and diverse 
crops.  Afghans who are unable to take advantage of these are likely to experience increased 
opium dependency.  Another dynamic aspect of Afghanistan’s history and the opium economy is 
the structural power relations that exist.  These power relationships are complex and highly 
contextual.  The case studies of Nangarhar, Helmand and Balkh illustrate this diversity.  The 
illicit opium economy is a vehicle for state and non-state actors to accumulate power.  The power 
they compete for or share determines part of the instability within these regions.  In some cases, 
the government officials with the ability to enforce opium bans can maintain political capital, but 
these positions are not guaranteed.  Furthermore, the land dispute in Achin demonstrates an 
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example of how the power structures can be utilized to increase instability for a certain agenda.  
Most importantly, the Afghans involved with opium production benefit the least with regard to 
power relationships and experience the most hardship with regard to opium bans and instability. 
 Lastly, the transnational networks symbolize flaws in policy towards Afghanistan.  
External countries’ counternarcotics policies, specifically the Western-backed eradication 
campaign, sustain and expand opium production.  These policies not only increase revenues for 
those higher in the value chain, they target those at the bottom of the chain.  This counter 
narcotic policy addresses the supply of opium, and by extension targets the people who cultivate 
the supply.  Eradication may impose some opportunity cost on wealthy landowners, but for 
resource poor farmers and laborers, the ones targeted most by eradication, there is no other 
choice but to cultivate opium.  The value chain also shows the highest prices when heroin 
reaches international markets, thus demonstrating that criminality significantly contributes to the 
risk premium of opium production.  This criminality is imposed ineffectively by external actors 
and also fosters collusion between state and non-state actors that operate near the starting points 
of Afghanistan’s smuggling networks.   
 The combination of these points presents two recommendations for future analysis on 
opium in Afghanistan.  The first point is that any research or policy recommendation must view 
opium production within the context outlined above, and that it is a rural livelihood strategy for 
the majority of those involved with it.  The implementation of eradication and crop substitution 
does not address this at all.  Eradication clearly has systemic flaws that hinder its effectiveness.  
Crop substitution, often dressed up as alternative livelihood campaigns, assumes that substituting 
opium for another crop will benefit farmers.  This research demonstrates that successful farmers 
diversify their crops and have access to relatively vibrant economic centers.  Investments in 
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infrastructure would allow more farmers to reach these economic centers and for better irrigation 
to reach agriculturally based population centers. 
 The final point concerns instability in Afghanistan.  Opium production is but one factor 
in a complex set of dynamics that influence instability.  The opium economy provides basic 
needs, extra income, enormous revenues, and political capital that are utilized to entrench state 
and non-state actors.  It also causes state and non-state actors to compete or share control of 
territory and opium profits.  The competition can be in numerous forms, but armed conflict 
increases instability.  When state actors benefit from the drug trade at the expense of others, their 
stance loses its legitimacy.  Non-state actors can offer protection against the state, which likely 
decreases stability.  They can also work with the state to enjoy the benefits of the drug trade.  
Until policy focuses on the majority of those that are involved in opium production and provides 
viable alternatives, instability will likely keep fluctuating to the detriment of Afghanistan. 
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Appendix A: 2007 Profit Tables 
Opium	  Profts	  
2007	   	   	   	   	   	  
Inputs	   	  	   Amount	   Unit	   Cost/Unit	   Total	  Cost	  
Seed	   	  	   0.5	   kg	   0	   0	  
Farm	  Power	   	  	   4	   hour	   400	   1,600	  
DAP	   	  	   1	   bag	   1,200	   1,200	  
Urea	   	  	   1.5	   bag	   700	   1,050	  
Hired	  labor	  
weeding	   	  	   10	   Person/day	   200	   2,000	  
Hired	  labor	  
harvest	   	  	   30	   Person/day	   350	   10,500	  
food	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   1,800	  
total	  cost	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   18,150	  
total	  yield	   	  	   10	   ser	  (1.2kg)	   4,500	   45,000	  
stern	  for	  fire	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   1,500	  
grain	   	  	   50	   ser	   100	   5,000	  
net	  return/jerib	   	  	   10	   ser	   4,500	   33,150	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Wheat	  Profits	  
2007	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Inputs	   	  	   Amount	   Unit	   Cost/Unit	   Total	  Cost	  
Seed	   	  	   	  	   	  	   0	   0	  
Farm	  Power	   	  	   2	   hour	   400	   800	  
DAP	   	  	   0.5	   bag	   1,200	   600	  
Urea	   	  	   1	   bag	   700	   700	  
Hired	  labor	   	  	   family	  	   Person/day	   150	   0	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
total	  cost	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   2,100	  
total	  yield	   	  	   120	   ser	  (1.2kg)	   80	   6,400	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
wheat	  straw	   	  	   240	   ser	   35	   8,400	  
net	  return/jerib	   	  	   120	   ser	   	  	   15,900	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Maize	  Profits	  
2007	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Inputs	   	  	   Amount	   Unit	   Cost/Unit	   Total	  Cost	  
85	  
	  
Seed	   	  	   2	   kg	   80	   160	  
Farm	  Power	   	  	   3	   day	   300	   900	  
DAP	   	  	   0.5	   bag	   1,200	   600	  
Urea	   	  	   1	   bag	   700	   700	  
Hired	  labor	   	  	   family	   Person/day	   0	   0	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
total	  cost	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   2,360	  
total	  yield	   	  	   100	   ser	  (1.2kg)	   60	   6,000	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Stern	  for	  animals	   	  	   100	   ser	   30	   3,000	  
net	  return/jerib	   	  	   100	   ser	   60	   6,640	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Potato	  Profits	  
2007	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Inputs	   	  	   Amount	   Unit	   Cost/Unit	   Total	  Cost	  
Seed	   	  	   50	   kg	   100	   5000	  
Farm	  Power	   	  	   4	   day	   300	   1,200	  
DAP	   	  	   0.5	   bag	   1,200	   600	  
Urea	   	  	   1	   bag	   700	   700	  
Hired	  labor	   	  	   family	   Person/day	   0	   0	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
total	  cost	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   20,000	  
total	  yield	   	  	   600	   ser	  (1.2kg)	   70	   42,000	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
net	  return/jerib	   	  	   600	   ser	   4,500	   34,500	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Okra	  Profits	  2007	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Inputs	   	  	   Amount	   Unit	   Cost/Unit	   Total	  Cost	  
Seed	   	  	   1	   kg	   50	   350	  
Farm	  Power	   	  	   4	   day	   300	   1,200	  
86	  
	  
DAP	   	  	   1	   bag	   1,200	   1,200	  
Urea	   	  	   2	   bag	   700	   1,400	  
Agrochemicals	   	  	   1	   liter	   500	   500	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
total	  cost	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   4,650	  
total	  yield	   	  	   800	   ser	  (1.2kg)	   50	   40,000	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
net	  return/jerib	   	  	   800	   ser	   	  	   33,350	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Rice	  Profits	  2007	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Inputs	   	  	   Amount	   Unit	   Cost/Unit	   Total	  Cost	  
Seed	   	  	   3	   kg	   100	   300	  
Farm	  Power	   	  	   3	   day	   300	   900	  
DAP	   	  	   0.5	   bag	   1,400	   700	  
Urea	   	  	   1	   bag	   700	   700	  
Hired	  labor	   	  	   6	   Person/day	   200	   1,200	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
total	  cost	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   3,800	  
total	  yield	   	  	   80	   ser	  (1.2kg)	   150	   7,200	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
rice	  straw	   	  	   25	   bar	   100	   2,500	  
net	  return/jerib	   	  	   80	   ser	   	  	   5,900	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Cotton	  Profits	  
2007	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Inputs	   	  	   Amount	   Unit	   Cost/Unit	   Total	  Cost	  
Seed	   	  	   1	   kg	   120	   120	  
Farm	  Power	   	  	   1	   hour	   500	   500	  
DAP	   	  	   0.5	   bag	   1,200	   600	  
Urea	   	  	   0.5	   bag	   700	   350	  
87	  
	  
Hired	  labor	  	   	  	   20	   Person/day	   150	   3,000	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
total	  cost	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   3,800	  
total	  yield	   	  	   65	   ser	  (1.2kg)	   230	   14,950	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
firewood	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   3,000	  
net	  return/jerib	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   13,850	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Appendix B: Total Imports by Country (Kazakhstan & 
Uzbekistan via Mazar-e-Sharif) 
	  
	  
Total	  Imports	  By	  
Country	  (US$	  Millions)	  
2007	   2008	   2009	  
Kazakhstan	   85	   74	   165	  
Uzbekistan	   144	   167	   501	  
165	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Afghanistan	  Central	  Statistics	  Office.	  http://www.cso.gov.af	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Map of Afghanistan Used Throughout Thesis 
Afghanistan 
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